

HamMUN 2018

"Reflect the Past. Reshape the Future."

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANISATION**

Hamburg Model United Nations

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LETTER OF WELCOME

Dear delegates,

It is our pleasure to welcome you to this year's NATO committee at the 2018 HamMUN session. We're excited to have you and look forward to seeing your skills in debate and diplomacy as you navigate our two topics: Women in NATO and the Role of NATO in the Mediterranean.

In this guide, we've outlined for you the history and background of the issues; explained why we think these need to be debated; and outlined our expectations for the upcoming resolutions. They will require you to think outside of the box, be on your feet, and consider information that is not usually discussed during NATO-MUN simulations. In doing so, we hope to stimulate your interest in the topics, whilst leaving you intellectually sated at the end of our final session (although, in all honesty, other influences may also factor into your exhaustion).

Please note that this guide is not meant to replace your own research but to serve as a starting point for further investigation and is therefore not a complete analysis of the topics at hand.

If you ever need help or guidance before, during or after the conference, please don't hesitate to send us a message at nato@hammun.de! Now without further ado, welcome to NATO!

Kind regards,

Isabel Vicaría Barker & Aisha Erenstein

Chairs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization | HamMUN 2018

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INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE

HISTORY AND ORIGIN

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was originally created on April 4th, 1949, with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty between the original 12 Allies. The purpose of the treaty, and the organization that would be built upon it, was “...detering Soviet expansionism, forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.”¹ The treaty also enshrined the key principle of mutual protection in Article 5, where it was detailed that “an armed attack against one or more of them... shall be considered an attack against them all”².

The treaty established an American military presence in Europe, countering the strength of the USSR and the threat posed to the West by its communist ideology, and was one of the defining features of the Cold War. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War, NATO’s nature and mandate had to change to remain relevant in the modern military arena. Its priorities and core tasks changed as the global focus shifted from bipolar nuclear politics and Mutually Assured Destruction to maintaining global peace in a multipolar world³.

CURRENT ROLE IN THE WORLD

Membership has expanded significantly since 1949: the organization now includes 29 States, many of which had previously been under Soviet rule⁴. Today, NATO’s three core tasks are “utilizing collective defence, managing crisis situations and encouraging cooperative security”⁵. It now acts mainly as a peacekeeping force, collaborating with civilian organizations and partner governments to help create and maintain the peace after a conflict⁶.

The Alliance has adopted the policy of a “comprehensive approach”, committing itself to being involved in “all stages of a crisis - before, during and after”⁷. NATO’s forces are internationally

¹ "A Short History Of NATO" 2018

² "The North Atlantic Treaty" 2018

³ "A Short History Of NATO" 2018

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "NATO'S Purpose" 2018

⁶ "A Short History Of NATO" 2018

⁷ Ibid.

recognized as highly trained, respected, and educated in their respective fields; and the organization is dedicated to keeping a high moral standard internally and in its operations⁸.

COMMITTEE SETUP

At HamMUN this year we will be simulating the function of NATO through its central organ, the North Atlantic Treaty Council (NATC). At the Council, 29 delegates are present, each representing one of NATO's 29 Member States. At the end of the conference, the committee should have produced a joint document detailing either an action plan or declaration, as appropriate, for each topic discussed. This document should follow a similar format to those of a United Nations Security Council Resolution, using similar language and the format of clauses and sub-clauses. The document does however need to be passed unanimously.

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https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

⁸ "Education And Training". 2018

TOPIC A: WOMEN IN NATO

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Throughout history, the way in which women have been affected by conflict and war has gone largely unrecognized⁹. Military institutions have, traditionally, discriminated against women joining their forces, and many have only recently started integrating women into their combat forces¹⁰. Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (CRSGBV) has long been considered a normal part of or follow-up of warfare, specifically targeting the women who had to stay at home and take care of their families¹¹.

As stated by NATO's Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security Ambassador Claire Hutchinson, on March 28th, 2018:

*"Conflict-Related SGBV is not just an evitable consequence of conflict but that is can also be one of the root causes of it. We have translated these guidelines into operational effective practices that will enhance the protection of women and girls because if we don't address this head on, this violation of the human rights will continue to torment whole populations."*¹²

The Global Study commissioned by the United Nations (UN), which examined the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325¹³ on its 15th anniversary, showed the world that the inclusion of women in peace negotiations was significant to the long-lasting success of those efforts¹⁴. Overall, 50% of peace processes dissolve within five years of an agreement being made, whilst the discussions often take months or years themselves¹⁵. Often, it should be noted, women are amongst the groups that are consistently left out of these processes, even though:

*"The Global Study cites evidence-based research to the effect that in 40 peace processes adopted since the end of the Cold War there was not one single case where organised women's groups had a negative effect on the process, which was not the case for other social actors."*¹⁶

⁹ "High-Level Review On Women, Peace And Security: 15 Years Of Security Council Resolution 1325" 2015

¹⁰ King 2015

¹¹ "Landmark Resolution On Women, Peace And Security (Security Council Resolution 1325)" 2018; *Resolution 1325 (2000)* 2000

¹² "NATO Organises Second Workshop On Military Guidelines On The Prevention Of, And Response To, Conflict-Related Sexual And Gender Based Violence" 2018

¹³ See page 7 of the Guide for more information on UNSCR 1325

¹⁴ "Women, Peace And Security: Shifting From Rhetoric To Practice" 2017

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

In addition to this, when women's groups are included in the making of an agreement, the longevity and the comprehensiveness of the agreement increase¹⁷. Peace negotiations where women played an active role were 64% more likely to be successful in achieving peace and 20% more likely to yield agreements lasting longer than two years, a number which increased to 35% when the time extension was 15 years¹⁸.

Outside of the negotiations, women play an important role when included in the forces or in maintaining security of an area¹⁹. UN peacekeeping missions have demonstrated that the presence of female soldiers is crucial to the establishing of relationships and confidence between local civilian populations and forces²⁰. Furthermore, women play a key role in providing important information that "[shapes] peace operations to better respond to their protection needs", and in effective counter-radicalization within local communities²¹. Nevertheless, the inclusion of women in leading roles is still often considered an "ad hoc measure" -- not prioritized -- and consequently suffers from a lack of funding, no political will, and systematic obstacles²². Landmark resolutions on gender issues were only passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) starting in 2000. The first of these is United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR), which stated that:

*"The resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. Resolution 1325 urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. It also calls on all parties to conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, in situations of armed conflict."*²³

UNSCR 1325 was followed by six other resolutions, which combine to create the modern international framework known as 'Women, Peace and Security' which advocates for women's empowerment and active inclusion in peace and security processes²⁴. These resolutions have been adopted by several international institutions, including NATO, which started adopting them in 2007.

¹⁷ "Women, Peace And Security: Shifting From Rhetoric To Practice" 2017

¹⁸ "Women, Peace And Security: Shifting From Rhetoric To Practice" 2017; "High-Level Review On Women, Peace And Security: 15 Years Of Security Council Resolution 1325" 2015; "Tracing The Role Of Women In Global Peacemaking" 2018

¹⁹ "High-Level Review On Women, Peace And Security: 15 Years Of Security Council Resolution 1325" 2015

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ "Landmark Resolution On Women, Peace And Security (Security Council Resolution 1325)" 2018

²⁴ Schuurman 2014

The resolutions adopted by NATO are detailed below:

| UNSCR | Year passed | Distinguishing content |
|-------|-------------|---|
| 1820* | 2008 | Officially designated CRSGBV as a war crime and/or a crime against humanity or one which could contribute to a genocide; recognized the long-lasting and exacerbating effects CRSGBV has on communities; directly tied this matter to the responsibilities of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) ²⁵ . |
| 1888* | 2009 | Specifically mandates UN protection from CRSGBV in armed conflicts; specifies that the UNSG appoint Special Representatives and Women's Protection Advisors to oversee this in missions and that UN investigative teams be sent to areas of interest affected by this ²⁶ . |
| 1889* | 2009 | Emphasizes and urges the inclusion of women in all stages of peace processes, decision-making, and leadership; pushes for the inclusion of the impact on women and girls in reports to the UN; made the first steps to ensure universal inclusion of women in policies ²⁷ . |
| 1960* | 2010 | Focuses on the need for information on perpetrators of CRSGBV, and for the sharing of this information within the UN and other affiliated parties; strengthens the UN's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation or abuse through the UNSG ²⁸ . |
| 2106* | 2013 | Draws attention to the contributions of judiciary committees in the persecution of perpetrators of CRSGBV; recognizes that CRSGBV is not limited to women/girls, but also men/boys, and that the need for aid is universal; recognizes the relation between GRSGBV and HIV/AIDS ²⁹ . |
| 2122* | 2013 | Pushes for further inclusion of women throughout UN missions and within the civil society structures of member states; calls for more |

²⁵ Resolution 1820 (2008) 2008

²⁶ Resolution 1888 (2009) 2009

²⁷ Resolution 1889 (2009) 2009

²⁸ Resolution 1960 (2010) 2010

²⁹ Resolution 2106 (2013) 2013

| | | |
|--|--|--|
| | | thorough education about gender affairs within the UN and for UN missions; brings WPS to the forefront of the annual reports ³⁰ . |
|--|--|--|

* UNSCR's marked with an asterisk (*) passed unanimously

In the past few decades, NATO as an institution has come to embrace the need for modernization and a shift of focus in their mission. This has also incorporated the inclusion of women and gender-based perspectives in all areas, whether it be “on the ground” with their forces, the civilians they work with, or within their institution as well³¹.

In 2012, the role of Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security (SRWPS) was created to serve as “the high-level focal point” of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda within NATO³². The SRWPS serves to improve coordination between NATO’s policies and actions on the WPS front; to ensure consistency throughout the organization; to oversee the implementation; and to integrate the *NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and related Resolutions*³³. As of this year, the post is being held by Clare Hutchinson, who worked for the UN as a gender specialist and advisor; her predecessors were Marriët Schuurman (2014 - 2017)³⁴ and Mari Skåre (2012 - 2014)³⁵.

Since 2012, NATO has made significant efforts in “norm setting”, which is the drafting of policies; creating of plans, guidelines and directives; improving awareness; and in facilitating the inclusion of gender expertise³⁶. Key amongst this is the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2007 and its progressive institutionalization since³⁷. This has impacted several NATO missions, particularly those in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF), which were investigated by an independent review on the implementation of UNSCR 1325. This review concluded that “significant progress” had been achieved although there was still “ample room for improvement”³⁸. Specific improvements that were suggested included: gender advisors in all levels of military commands, including senior levels; Gender Focal Points being set up for individual missions (specifically KFOR and ISAF); and the use of gender enablers³⁹. As of now, these can all be found in the NATO organizational infrastructure.

³⁰ *Resolution 2122 (2013)* 2013

³¹ "Women, Peace And Security" 2018

³² "Women, Peace And Security" 2018

³³ "Clare Hutchinson, NATO Secretary General's Special Representative On Women, Peace And Security" 2018

³⁴ "Marriët Schuurman, NATO Secretary General's Special Representative On Women, Peace And Security" 2017

³⁵ "Mari Skåre, NATO Secretary General's Special Representative On Women, Peace And Security" 2015

³⁶ Schuurman 2014

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Lackenbauer and Langlais 2013

³⁹ Schuurman 2014

Figure A (below) details how this approach has been applied within the NATO forces; a similar setup also applies to Strategic Command, Allied Command Operations, Allied Command Transition, and all NATO-led operations and missions where gender advisers help commanders integrate a gender perspective into every part of an operation.




Figure A ⁴⁰

In addition to this, a platform has also been set up between NATO and civil society called the Civil Society Advisory Panel (CSAP). This provides a specific platform for the discussion of women and gender-related issues outside of the organizational and governance structure of NATO itself⁴¹. Through the CSAP, NATO aims to collaborate with civil society organizations on a national and international level in the further “integration of a gender perspective into NATO’s core tasks liaises with women’s organisations”⁴². The CSAP provides yearly recommendations, feedback and consultations to NATO on WSP matters and a dialogue channel between NATO and civil society⁴³. Furthermore, the CSAP is responsible for helping setting up ties between NATO and important local figures and parties involved in WSP matters in areas where NATO or its partners are active⁴⁴.

⁴⁰ "Women, Peace And Security" 2018

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Report Of The First Annual Meeting 2016

⁴⁴ Report Of The First Annual Meeting 2016; TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE CIVIL SOCIETY ADVISORY PANEL ON WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY 2016

A comparable platform was created within NATO: the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP)⁴⁵. Comprised of delegates sent from Member States, the NCGP serves to mainstream the gender perspectives that NATO strives to include in its policies and actions, so that the organization can best incorporate and build upon the experiences of both the men and women who work for it⁴⁶. Furthermore, the committee creates an internal checkpoint for NATO's handling and organization-wide integration of gender issues; it also helps inform the organization of how it is performing on this front in military operations⁴⁷. The committee is at the disposal of the Executive Committee and the Military Committee, both senior NATO authorities for the handling and investigation of gender-related issues⁴⁸.

TIMELINE

| | |
|------|--|
| 1961 | First conference organized by senior NATO female officers to review the status, organization, conditions of employment and career possibilities of women in NATO. These conferences were to be organized on an ad-hoc basis until 1976 ⁴⁹ . |
| 1976 | The formation and official designation of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWINF); the committee now meets on an annual basis ⁵⁰ . |
| 1979 | The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) is passed by the UNGA; hailed as a protection of women's human rights, it has been ratified by 189 states ⁵¹ . |
| 1998 | The Office on Women in the NATO Forces is formed and given a permanent office to provide guidance on gender and diversity matters within NATO, and provide an office within the NATO organization to support the CWINF; now called the Office of the Gender Advisor ⁵² . |
| 2000 | Landmark resolution 1325 passes unanimously through the UNSC, paving the way for several other resolutions enshrining gender equality, women's rights and the battle against CRSGBV; although the resolution is a UN resolution, it created several ripple effects in international organizations worldwide, including NATO, who |

⁴⁵ "Gender Perspectives In NATO Armed Forces" 2017

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ "Gender Perspectives In NATO Armed Forces" 2017

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ "Gender Perspectives In NATO Armed Forces" 2017; "Women, Peace And Security: Shifting From Rhetoric To Practice" 2017

⁵¹ *BI-STRATEGIC COMMAND DIRECTIVE (BI-SCD) 40-1 INTEGRATING UNSCR 1325 AND GENDER PERSPECTIVE INTO THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE* 2012

⁵² "Gender Perspectives In NATO Armed Forces" 2017

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|------|--|
| | either imposed their own policies, or adopted the resolution ⁵³ . |
| 2002 | The Prague Summit is held in November, where Ally countries task NATO's IS to create a Task Force specializing in gender perspectives, balance, and diversity; this Task Force would recommend actions to both the IS and the IMS (i.e. military and civilian departments) ⁵⁴ . |
| 2003 | The Task Force starts working in February 2003 and produces the an Action Plan for the by June ⁵⁵ . NATO ratifies an organization-wide Equal Opportunities and Diversity Policy, applicable to all its bodies and offices ⁵⁶ . |
| 2007 | In December, NATO, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and other NATO-allies review their policies to explicitly support the application of the UNSCR's relating to the WPS agenda ⁵⁷ . The first NATO WPS Action Plan is issued for the years 2007 - 2010; this plan specifies three objectives: 1) "to establish and maintain a NATO Diversity Framework and Policy; 2) to improve the NATO work environment; and 3) to promote and improve NATO's image as an employer of choice" ⁵⁸ . |
| 2008 | UNSCR 1820 on CRSGBV passes unanimously through the UNSC ⁵⁹ . |
| 2009 | UNSCR's 1888 on Special Representatives and WPA, and 1889 on the inclusion of women in peace processes and decision-making, pass unanimously through the UNSC ⁶⁰ . In May, the CWINF mandate grows to include the overseeing of incorporating gender perspectives into NATO's military operations; the CWINF is renamed the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NSCP) ⁶¹ . |

⁵³ *Resolution 1325 (2000)* 2000

⁵⁴ "Gender Balance And Diversity In NATO" 2011

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ "Women, Peace And Security" 2018

⁵⁸ "Gender Balance And Diversity In NATO" 2011

⁵⁹ *Resolution 1820 (2008)* 2008

⁶⁰ *Resolution 1888 (2009)* 2009; *Resolution 1889 (2009)* 2009

⁶¹ "Gender Perspectives In NATO Armed Forces" 2017

| | |
|------|---|
| 2010 | UNSCR 1960 on information sharing regarding perpetrators of CRSGBV between UN and affiliated bodies passes unanimously through the UNSC ⁶² . |
| 2012 | NATO adopts the UNSCR's on WPS into NATO policy in a Directive ⁶³ . In May, the Chicago Summit Declaration reinforces NATO support for the WPS Agenda by backing the Chairman's Strategic Progress Report on mainstreaming WPS UNSCR's into NATO policy ⁶⁴ . |
| 2013 | The UNSC unanimously passes Resolutions 2106 (recognizing CRSGBV as a universal problem affecting all genders) and 2122 (the further inclusion of women in peace processes and the inclusion of WPS matters in the UNSG's annual report) ⁶⁵ . |
| 2014 | At the Wales Summit, Allied leaders jointly agree that incorporating gender perspectives is crucial in the modernization future effectiveness of NATO ⁶⁶ . In September, the Special Representative of WPS is made a permanent position within NATO ⁶⁷ ; the NATO Education and Training Plan for Gender in Military Operations is authorized to streamline the gender education and training throughout all of NATO ⁶⁸ . From 2014 onwards, the bi-annual revision of the WPS Action Plan becomes part of NATO policy ⁶⁹ . |
| 2015 | NATO and its partners adopt the Military Guidelines on the Protection of, and Response to, Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence ⁷⁰ . NATO pioneers the inclusion gender perspectives as an objective in their crisis management exercise ⁷¹ . |

⁶² Resolution 1960 (2010) 2010

⁶³ BI-STRATEGIC COMMAND DIRECTIVE (BI-SCD) 40-1 INTEGRATING UNSCR 1325 AND GENDER PERSPECTIVE INTO THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE 2012; Schuurman 2014

⁶⁴ BI-STRATEGIC COMMAND DIRECTIVE (BI-SCD) 40-1 INTEGRATING UNSCR 1325 AND GENDER PERSPECTIVE INTO THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE 2012

⁶⁵ Resolution 2106 (2013) 2013; Resolution 2122 (2013) 2013

⁶⁶ "Women, Peace And Security" 2018

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Schuurman 2014

⁶⁹ "Women, Peace And Security" 2018

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ "Women, Peace And Security" 2018; Schuurman 2014

| | |
|------|--|
| 2016 | The current iteration of the Action Plan is published, to last until June 2018 ⁷² . |
| 2018 | <p>As of June, the latest revisions of the Action Plan for 2016 - 2018 are underway; reports on the effectiveness and success of the last Action Plan have yet to be made public⁷³.</p> <p>Annual conference of NCGP is held from the 29th of May to the 1st of June in Brussels, with the overarching theme of “A 360 degree approach to gender”⁷⁴.</p> |

CURRENT SITUATION

“Much has been achieved in laying the groundwork: the framework is in place and now is the time to start using it.”

Marriët Schuurman, Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security 2014 - 2017⁷⁵

“Gender should be an integral part of every division’s activities, every operation, planned and current, as well as its resources, intelligence, budget and finances [...] It should be part of the people’s mindset – this is mainstreaming.”

Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee⁷⁶

“What exactly are we afraid of, being more effective?”

Michaëlle Jean, Secretary General of the Organization internationale de la Francophonie at the UNSC’s annual open session on WPS in October 2017⁷⁷

In many ways, NATO’s policies are amongst the fairest and most pro-WPS found in the world. However, it is in the implementation of these policies that there are issues, as these policies have not yet yielded the desired results⁷⁸. NATO has been called upon by two of its Special Representatives to improve the outcome and practical implementation of their policies, yet this

⁷² "Women, Peace And Security" 2018

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ "NATO And Partners Focus On Strengthening Gender Perspectives" 2018

⁷⁵ Schuurman 2014

⁷⁶ "Gender Balance And Diversity In NATO" 2011

⁷⁷ Zimmerman 2017

⁷⁸ Schuurman 2014; "NATO Reaffirms Its Commitment To Women’S Security In Close Partnership With The International Community" 2018

remains an area of struggle. The *2017 Report of the Secretary General on women and peace and security* also acknowledged that “the actual implementation of the women and peace and security agenda continues to fall short.”⁷⁹

These failures are in part due to a lack of women soldiers or delegates being sent from the Allies, upon which NATO is dependent⁸⁰. A key example of an issue in this matter is that certain jobs remain exclusive to men in some countries, particularly combat positions, work in submarines and tanks⁸¹. Overall, women’s participation has only increased from 7.4% in 1999 to 10.6% in 2013; in total that means that only 6.7% of troops in NATO-led operations are women⁸². This does not mean that the efforts to increase female participation in armed forces were minimal, but rather that they were not effective enough⁸³.

Other focal areas for future improvements, as identified by Marriët Schuurman in 2017 are:

- 1) *“the further deployment of female staff as well as male and female Gender Advisors;*
- 2) *the further integration of a gender perspective in military assessments, intelligence, planning, operations and reporting; and*
- 3) *the need to identify local women as important actors in our mission areas and consult with them on that basis.”*⁸⁴

It must be noted that steps have been taken to target these areas through the implementation of the International Protocol on the Documentation and Investigation of Sexual Violence in Conflict, to aid with the prosecution of CRSGBV in individual cases. This protocol has been tested in other missions, and revised based upon feedback from these trials, which makes it presumably more effective than previous methods⁸⁵. However, concrete data has yet to be released to the public. Along the same line, NATO is looking at incorporating research opportunities into missions through collaborative efforts with the LSE Centre and the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme so that the data gathered can help inform policymakers on potential improvements and faulty areas⁸⁶.

Another important aspect NATO has been struggling with is women’s empowerment⁸⁷. Progress has been made when it comes to women’s involvement, with women comprising 37% of international staff and 21% of senior decision-makers⁸⁸. Yet, this progress has largely

⁷⁹ *Report Of The Secretary-General On Women And Peace And Security 2017*

⁸⁰ Schuurman 2014

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ “Women, Peace And Security: Shifting From Rhetoric To Practice” 2017

⁸⁶ “Women, Peace And Security: Shifting From Rhetoric To Practice” 2017; Schuurman 2014

⁸⁷ “Women In Security: Climbing A Very Long Ladder” 2018; Schuurman 2014

⁸⁸ Schuurman 2014

stagnated or even fallen backwards due to budget and staff cuts⁸⁹. To keep track of this, diversity scorecards have been implemented in all divisions⁹⁰. Furthermore, a mentoring program has been developed to encourage young female talent to move into leadership positions without compromising NATO's meritocracy⁹¹.

Aside from this, the integration and strengthening of gender perspectives is also a priority⁹². Much of the current policy changes already target this area, but the changing of mindsets is a long-term effort that has yet to be fully achieved. Specific areas that have been identified as in need of extra attention here are arms control, small arms and mine action, building integrity, counterterrorism, children and armed conflict, human trafficking, and the protection of civilians⁹³.

In the words of Marriët Schuurman,

*"The main challenge ahead of us will be to keep the women, peace, and security agenda on the political agenda in a time when our security environment has drastically changed. When we are no longer mainly concerned with exporting peace and security but are also forced to re-think how we protect peace and security at home, in our own countries and region; how we defend the principles on which our peace and security is based: individual freedom, democracy, human rights, and rule of law; how we safeguard a Europe at peace, whole and free."*⁹⁴

The first iterations of the plan (up to 2016) focused on the creation of a functional WPS framework. Between 2016 and 2018, the focus lay on mainstreaming the efforts into a cohesive and sweeping overarching plan for all of NATO. The next iteration of the Action Plan is yet to be completed, and a draft of this is what we encourage our delegates to create in debate.

QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER

- What policies have been effective in tackling NATO's gender issues the past? Which haven't?
- How can NATO further, and more effectively integrate gender perspectives into overall policy?

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ "Women In Security: Climbing A Very Long Ladder" 2018; Schuurman 2014

⁹² Schuurman 2014

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

- How can NATO maximize on the benefits of (further) integrating a gendered perspective into their policies?
- Why is it crucial to adapt current policies to further integrate gendered perspective?
- How can we further mainstream inclusion? ⁹⁵
- What comes next in the WPS program?
- What will be the requirements of Ally countries in fulfilling the next Action Plan?

CLOSING REMARKS

This debate will not be a traditional one. There is no clear right or wrong. There are no clear dividing lines between parties; in this debate all participants have already agreed to the premises outlined by UNSCR 1325 and the WPS UNSCR's. What we want is for delegates to work together in a collaborative effort to improve the current NATO policy, framework, and objectives. The complexity arises from finding the best way to achieve this, whilst keeping in mind national priorities and the priorities of NATO's allies (both nations and organizations alike). Ultimately, the product of this should be a joint document in the form of an action plan that is realistic for both NATO and its members for the next two years.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

- https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_04/20150414_20120808_NU_Bi-SCD_40-11.pdf
 - *The directive authorizing the WPS Action Plan as of 2012; provides a comprehensive outline of NATO's approach and plan for the matter*
- <http://www.natolibguides.info/women/home>
 - *Lots of info, concentrated and with brief summaries*
- <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Themes/EN/index.htm>
 - *Not as clearly NATO propaganda*
- <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/adapting-nato-to-an-unpredictable-and-fast-changing-world-defence-alliance-security/EN/index.htm>
 - *NATO & their priorities in the modern age*
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PLhYE8cjKxVOPPkxKWRXqWF3XqWRhruf0&v=sxfICb7paY8&ab_channel=SIPRI
 - *Good starting point, gets you into the mindset*
- <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/women-a-nato-special-operations-forces-force-multiplier-1>

⁹⁵ "Gender Balance And Diversity In NATO" 2011

- *Overview of various ideologies and ways to integrate women into the NATO military*
- <http://theforeignpolicyproject.org/women-of-nato/>
 - *For more information, may not be directly relevant to debate though*
- https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_03/20170313_SG_AnnualReport_2016_en.pdf#page=83
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TOPIC B: THE ROLE OF NATO IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

It is often said that Europe - and therefore NATO - is surrounded by an “arc of crisis”⁹⁶: the conflict and ensuing instability in the Middle East (the Iraqi Civil War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Syrian Civil War, to name a few) and the instability and emergence of Islamist terror in Northern Africa - all of these pose security threats for Europe and NATO. NATO has recognised the Mediterranean as a region of strategic importance in the Madrid Summit Declaration of 1997. As stated in Clause 13 of said Declaration, “the Mediterranean region merits great attention since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean.”⁹⁷ The emergence and advancement of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue reflects NATO’s commitment to the region.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND: THE NATO MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

Established in 1994, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) is a forum for NATO Member States and seven non-NATO countries – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia⁹⁸ – to discuss security matters pertaining to the Mediterranean that require cooperation⁹⁹. The meetings are mainly conducted in a bilateral format (NATO +1) but may also convene as multilateral meetings (NATO+7).¹⁰⁰

It aims to “contribute to regional security and stability”, “achieve better mutual understanding” and “dispel any misconceptions about NATO among Dialogue countries”.¹⁰¹ It is guided by the principles of **non-discrimination** (all non-NATO partners are treated on the same basis), **self-differentiation** (which allows cooperation to be adapted to the needs and capabilities of each non-NATO partner), **inclusiveness** (all participants are considered as ‘shareholders’ of cooperation), **two-way engagement** (non-NATO members are to contribute to cooperation rather than merely consulting), **non-imposition** (NATO may not impose or force cooperation with non-NATO members), **complementarity and mutual reinforcement** (cooperation is to complement and reinforce the work of other intergovernmental organisations such as the EU or the OSCE) and **diversity** (regional, cultural and political contexts of the different countries is to be taken into consideration).¹⁰²

The MD is based on two pillars: political dialogue and practical cooperation.

⁹⁶ Pierini 2016.

⁹⁷ Madrid Summit.

⁹⁸ Collectively referred to as non-NATO partners or MD partners

⁹⁹ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹⁰⁰ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹⁰¹ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹⁰² “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

POLITICAL DIALOGUE

First known as the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG), it was established at Madrid Summit in July 1997¹⁰³ and was placed under the supervision of the North Atlantic Council, which had the overall responsibility.¹⁰⁴ In 2011, the MGC was replaced by the Political and Partnerships Committee, which oversees all partnerships with third parties.

The MD was elevated to a genuine partnership at the June 2004 Istanbul Summit by NATO's Heads of States and Governments:

*“In the current security environment there are greater opportunities for effective cooperation with Mediterranean Dialogue partners. Following our decision at Prague to upgrade the Mediterranean Dialogue, we are today inviting our Mediterranean partners to establish a more ambitious and expanded partnership, guided by the principle of joint ownership and taking into consideration their particular interests and needs. The overall aim of this partnership will be to contribute towards regional security and stability through stronger practical cooperation, including by enhancing the existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing defence reform and contributing to the fight against terrorism. Our efforts will complement and mutually reinforce other Mediterranean initiatives, including those of the EU and the OSCE”.*¹⁰⁵

Since then, meetings between NATO Members and MD partners have taken place on a regular basis and on different working level formats – bilateral and multilateral as well as ministerial or ambassadorial.¹⁰⁶ The need for cooperation in security matters was deemed a NATO priority in the Lisbon Summit Declaration of 2011:

*“We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We will aim to deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region”.*¹⁰⁷

PRACTICAL COOPERATION

The practical dimension of the MD mainly consists of the creation of work programmes that include practical activities such as seminars and workshops. Each year since the Istanbul Summit in 2004, the MD compiles a Work Programme (MDWP) that formalises agreed-upon priority areas and applies to all participating states. It “has been the main cooperation

¹⁰³ Cf. Clause 13 of the Madrid Declaration

¹⁰⁴ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹⁰⁵ Clause 36, “Istanbul Summit Communiqué” (2004).

¹⁰⁶ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹⁰⁷ Clause 35, “Lisbon Summit - Strategic Concept” (2011).

instrument available and has been expanded progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 2004, to over 700 activities and events in 2011”.¹⁰⁸ While the MDWP mainly (ca. 85%) focuses on military activities, it also focuses on other areas such as military education, defence policy and strategy, and armaments and intelligence related activities¹⁰⁹, to name a few. A sample MDWP can be found [here](#).

However, these have to be distinguished from the Individual and Partnership Cooperation Programme (IPCP), which are bilateral partnership agreements adapted to each country’s security needs and form the main instrument of focused cooperation¹¹⁰. As it stands, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Mauritania as well as Tunisia all have IPCPs with NATO¹¹¹ that focus on agreed priority areas and have served as the main cooperation instrument. They have been expanded progressively in more than 30 areas of cooperation, going from about 100 activities in 2004, to over 700 activities and events in 2011.¹¹²

The practical dimension also includes a military dimension, which often consists in the invitation to observe and sometimes participate in military exercises or visits to NATO’S Standing Naval Forces.¹¹³ Twice a year, NATO+7 consultation meetings take place, which include military representatives from NATO and MD partners.¹¹⁴

CURRENT SITUATION: THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION AND THE “PACKAGE ON THE SOUTH”

While the Brussels NATO Summit of July 2018 saw US President Donald Trump heavily criticize his fellow NATO allies for not spending enough on their military, it also saw the adoption of the so-called Package on the South in Clause 55:

“We have today endorsed a Package on the South, which includes a range of political and practical cooperation initiatives towards a more strategic, focused, and coherent approach to the Middle East and North Africa, a region facing a multitude of complex threats and challenges, which in turn affect our security. Within that overall strategic aim, we are pursuing three main objectives: to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence against threats emanating from the south; to contribute to international crisis management efforts in the region; and to help our regional partners build resilience against security threats, including in the fight against terrorism.”¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁸ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹⁰⁹ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹¹⁰ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹¹¹ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹¹² “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹¹³ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹¹⁴ “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue” (2015).

¹¹⁵ Brussels Summit Declaration

Essentially, the aim of the Package on the South is to organise all NATO “activities on its southern flank into a single system”¹¹⁶ and to “be the strategic and political guidance for the implementation of the Allied efforts in our neighbouring region”.¹¹⁷ The Italian Minister of Defense has stated that “all of this within a framework of renewed attention for the south and the Mediterranean, with a set of measures which respond to the needs of our citizens in terms of the Alliance’s border defence and collective security”.¹¹⁸ However, concrete details regarding the Package on the South have yet to be made known.

TERRORISM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

One of NATO’s main security concerns in the Mediterranean is that of terrorism. According to the Global Terrorism Database, the year “2017 marks the third consecutive year of declining numbers of terrorist attacks and deaths worldwide, since terrorist violence peaked in 2014 at nearly 17,000 attacks and more than 45,000 total deaths”.¹¹⁹ However, it should be noted that terrorist violence rates are still much higher compared to the decade before 9/11 – “the frequency and lethality of terrorist violence each year was less than one-third of what took place in 2017”.¹²⁰ While this is generally to be considered a positive development, certain Mediterranean countries – notably Turkey and Egypt – have experienced a rise in terrorism rates.¹²¹

When discussing the terrorist aspect of NATO’s security policy, it is important to bear in mind Europe’s history with it. As Alessandri, the Non-Resident Senior Transatlantic Fellow of the German Marshall Fund, points out, “terrorism is as strong as the environment allows. What makes Mediterranean-based terrorism such a significant global phenomenon is not just the existence of deep and long-standing cleavages in the region, but the fact that structures that could otherwise defuse, mediate, or channel conflict – starting with state institutions – are often weak or discredited. Against such backdrop, existing socio-economic, cultural, and religious differences can be powerfully exploited to propagate violence”.¹²²

As a consequence, both NATO and European security policies are strongly influenced by the threat of terrorism, especially in light of the continuing conflict situations in the southern and eastern parts of the Mediterranean and the economic and social issues in southern Europe.

¹¹⁶ Italian Ministry of Defence (2018).

¹¹⁷ Italian Ministry of Defence (2018).

¹¹⁸ Italian Ministry of Defence (2018).

¹¹⁹ Global Terrorism in 2017 – Background Report

¹²⁰ Global Terrorism in 2017 – Background Report


¹²¹ Lesser.

¹²² Alessandri.

RETURN OF ISLAMIC STATE FOREIGN FIGHTERS

One major security concern is the flow of terrorists through the region¹²³. Thousands of foreign fighters have been recruited in Europe to join the fighting in the Middle East as well as Libya.¹²⁴ According to Ian Lesser, the Vice President for Foreign Policy and Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund, it is estimated that around one third have already returned to their home countries.¹²⁵

Fig. 1 on the right shows the number of foreign fighters that have returned home. What is striking is that of the 12 countries displayed, 8 are NATO or MD partner countries. Interestingly, Tunisia is the Mediterranean country that has



produced the most foreign fighters, despite the fact that it is “seen as a relatively successful post-revolutionary society”¹²⁶. As Lesser further points out, “by contrast, relatively few Algerians have journeyed to fight for the Islamic State. The exhausting experience of Algerian terrorism in the 1990s, in which over 100,000 died, is widely seen as limiting the attraction of violent Islamism in contemporary Algeria.”¹²⁷ This may well be the case, although significant numbers of Algerians have joined AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) cells operating in North Africa and the Sahel”.¹²⁸


ISLAMIC TERRORISM AND TRADITIONAL EUROPEAN TERRORISM

It should be noted that the return of foreign fighters is not the only concern for NATO in the Mediterranean area. North Africa is home to numerous Islamist terrorist organisations, many of which are affiliated to Al Qaeda or to the Islamic State, as reflected in the map below.

¹²³ Lesser.
¹²⁴ Lesser.
¹²⁵ Lesser.
¹²⁶ Lesser.
¹²⁷ Lesser.
¹²⁸ Lesser.



AFRICA'S ACTIVE MILITANT ISLAMIST GROUPS



Updated: January 2018
 Note: Compiled by the Africa Center, this graphic shows violent events involving the listed groups over the 12-month period ending December 31, 2017. Data on attacks or fatalities does not attempt to distinguish the perpetrators of the events. Group listings are intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered official designations. Due to the fluid nature of many groups, the listed affiliations may change.
 Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Daniel Byman, Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre; Thomas Joscelyn, SITE Intelligence Group; The Soufan Group; Stanford University's Mapping Militants Project; Stratfor; Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC); and Aaron Y. Zelni.

The potential security threat these pose is evident. On the one hand, there is a large concern that terrorists could pose as refugees as a means to enter Europe. However, a report compiled by the Danish Institute for International Studies found that the terrorist acts committed between January 2016 and April 2017 were in fact committed by Europeans.¹²⁹ It also found that in the second half of 2015, European foreign fighters that had joined the Islamic State had returned to Europe by using migration routes and posed as refugees.¹³⁰

On the other hand, these terrorist groups could potentially contribute to the ongoing stability in Libya or destabilise Algeria, a country that has been able to remain relatively stable in the wake of the Arab Spring.¹³¹ Considering that Algeria houses a wealth of oil and gas and is the EU's fifth-largest energy provider, its destabilisation could have negative consequences for

¹²⁹ Crone, Falkentoft and Tammikko.

¹³⁰ Crone, Falkentoft and Tammikko.

¹³¹ Buzzetti.

both continental Europe.¹³² As Algeria is one of the three top trading partners for the USA in northern Africa and the Middle East, the USA too has a vested interest in maintaining stability in Algeria.¹³³

While terrorism is not a new phenomenon to Europe, Islamic terrorism has changed the game and therefore cannot be combatted with conventional means. One difference between ‘traditional European terrorism’ – for the purposes of this committee guide defined as the carrying out of terrorist acts by European in pursuance of political non-religious goals - and Islamic terrorism – acts of terrorism committed in the name of Islam – is “it does not limit its agenda to undermining the existing order. Rather, it claims to have already established a more legitimate and better functioning one in the “Caliphate”, as the Islamic State has done.”¹³⁴ It essentially aims to “fill the void left by the retreat or collapse of order”.¹³⁵ It should also be noted that “jihadi operatives today are acting on the basis of a religious and ethnic ideology and with the support of terrorist organizations abroad – and they can now move much more freely throughout most of Europe”,¹³⁶ which is way traditional methods of tracking terrorists are no longer sufficient.

On the other hand, it should be noted that “beyond violent Islamists, the Mediterranean remains a reservoir of terrorism and political violence based on secular ideologies of the left and the right, nationalism and ethnic grievances”.¹³⁷ Europe has had its fair share of fighting (political) terrorism, such as EFTA in Spain, the IRA in Ireland, the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in Germany, to name a few. However, even within southern Europe one will find low-intensity terrorism today, as is the case in Greece. Due to its history with separatist and ideological terrorism, Greece has a potential for a revival under conditions of protracted economic stress and political instability.¹³⁸ As Lesser further points out, “the general rise of populist movements could also encourage the emergence of xenophobic, anti-globalization or simply nihilistic terrorism on the fringes of radical politics.”¹³⁹ Nonetheless, traditional European terrorism is not really the focus of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and delegates should therefore focus on developing measures to combat Islamic terrorism, as these tend to seek to change the order of things.

¹³² Buzzetti

¹³³ Buzzetti

¹³⁴ Alessandri.

¹³⁵ Alessandri.

¹³⁶ Pierini.

¹³⁷ Lesser.

¹³⁸ Lesser.

¹³⁹ Lesser.

MARITIME TERRORISM

Another security threat is that of maritime terrorism - terrorism that directly affects maritime activity. Interestingly enough, there have been only a couple of terrorist attacks that took place within the Mediterranean or along the coast in ports and harbours.¹⁴⁰ The most notable incident of this type is the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1985 by the Palestinian Liberation Front.¹⁴¹ The presence of terrorist groupings in the Southern and Eastern parts of the Mediterranean means that commercial and cruise ships as well as military vessels are exposed to potential threats.¹⁴²

Nonetheless, there is potential for further attacks in the region. Strategically speaking, the main concerns surround the Suez Canal, with terrorist activity in the Sinai and the recent Islamic State attacks in Egypt.¹⁴³ Thus, the Egyptian government has invested in protecting the Suez Canal - and hence international trade and commerce - from terrorist attacks.¹⁴⁴ The Port of Gibraltar too is a concern¹⁴⁵, due to its proximity to Northern Africa. Offshore energy infrastructure in the eastern region of the Mediterranean also has potential of being a terrorist target - however, past attempted attacks have proven to be ineffective, as these are not easy targets.¹⁴⁶

Another potential area of concerns are coastal hotels and resorts. These are especially vulnerable, as these are easy and effective targets, considering the likelihood of Europeans holidaying in them. One recent example is the shootings at a resort near Sousse, Tunisia in which 38 people lost their lives and for which the Islamic State claimed responsibility.¹⁴⁷

POLITICAL INSTABILITY

While local European terrorism is less of a concern for NATO, the rise in violence committed by the PKK in Turkey definitely is.¹⁴⁸ The PKK - short for Kurdistan Workers' Party - is considered a terrorist organisation by many countries, including the EU, Turkey and the US¹⁴⁹. However, there is a debate about whether or not the PKK is in fact a terrorist organisation, as

¹⁴⁰ Lesser.

¹⁴¹ Lesser.

¹⁴² Lesser.

¹⁴³ Lesser.

¹⁴⁴ Lesser.

¹⁴⁵ Lesser.

¹⁴⁶ Lesser.

¹⁴⁷ "Tunisia attack: What happened"

¹⁴⁸ Lesser.

¹⁴⁹ "Who are Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) rebels?" (2016).

many countries to not recognise the PKK as one.¹⁵⁰ The UN does not recognise the PKK as a terrorist organisation, yet NATO does¹⁵¹.

Combined with the continuing flow of foreign fighters across the Turkish-Syrian border and attacks committed by - or in name of - the Islamic State, Turkey is facing much turmoil. Considering Turkey's membership on NATO, this is of particular concern, as the destabilisation could have ramifications for the rest of the Alliance. It has already negatively impacted tourism as well as international trade and investment.¹⁵²

Another case for concern is the current political situation in Libya, where IS has been able to expand its presence.¹⁵³ It is a direct security concern for NATO, as there is potential for ISIS to execute attacks on shipping and even NATO vessels stationed in the Mediterranean.¹⁵⁴ Without political stability in Libya, the threat - as well as the practise of human trafficking to Europe - will go unchallenged.

However, it is Egypt that has shown how devastating the effects of terrorism can be on stability and prosperity.¹⁵⁵ Egypt has seen attacks on all sorts of venues including government facilities, churches and hotels, leading to a sharp decline in international tourism.¹⁵⁶ With IS presence on the Sinai, it has potential to completely undermine government control and ultimately endanger the Suez Canal and therefore international trade.¹⁵⁷ As Lesser puts it, "The Egyptian case is probably the most striking Mediterranean example of the isolating effect of terrorism on countries that have come to depend on global flows of people and capital".¹⁵⁸

HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS

In February 2016, NATO agreed to support the European Union's endeavour in tackling the refugee and migration crisis and lend support to Turkey and Greece. Two days later, the Standing Maritime Group 2 - consisting of six ships from Greece, the UK, Netherlands and Turkey - arrived in the Aegean Sea. On a tactical and logistical level, NATO works closely with Frontex, the EU's Border Management Agency and on a political level, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has participated in discussions on the crisis with key EU persons.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁰ Cf. <https://anfenglish.com/news/belgian-court-pkk-is-not-a-terrorist-organisation-22119>

¹⁵¹ "NATO chief declares PKK terrorist group".

¹⁵² Lesser.

¹⁵³ Lesser (Feb 2016)

¹⁵⁴ Lesser (Feb 2016)

¹⁵⁵ Lesser.

¹⁵⁶ Lesser.

¹⁵⁷ Lesser.

¹⁵⁸ Lesser.

¹⁵⁹ "Fact Sheet: NATO's Deployment in the Mediterranean"

CURRENT AND PAST OPERATIONS

NATO has been involved in a number of operations in the Mediterranean, the two most important ones have been elaborated upon below.

Operation Active Endeavour (2001)

Launched in the wake of 9/11, NATO aimed to deter terrorist activity in the Mediterranean by increasing warship presence in the area¹⁶⁰. NATO aided in the securing one of the most important trade routes in the world by policing and monitoring ships in the Mediterranean. By deploying ships in the region, The Alliance aimed not only to deter terrorist activity but monitor the proliferation and transit of weapons of mass destruction. Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey were the main contributors to the operation in terms of naval assets and Denmark, Norway and Germany contributed fast patrol boats.

Operation Sea Guardian (current)

November 2016 saw the launch of Operation Sea Guardian which replaced Operation Active Endeavour. It is a maritime security operation (MSO) mandated to perform a variety of tasks and is currently focusing on three of seven MSO¹⁶¹ tasks: maritime security capacity building, and providing support to maritime situational awareness and to maritime counter-terrorism.¹⁶² It supports the EU's Operation Sophia by sharing information, providing logistical support and implementing United Nations Security Council Resolution 2357 (the arms embargo against Libya).¹⁶³

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

When conducting research and drafting documents during the NATO session at HamMUN 2018, delegates will have to consider the following aspects, amongst others:

- How and to what extent can NATO improve cooperation with non-NATO Mediterranean states? How can this cooperation be more effective?
- How and to what extent can NATO improve cooperation with non-NATO members of the European Union (ie. Malta, Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden)? How can this cooperation be more effective?

¹⁶⁰ "Operation Active Endeavour".

¹⁶¹ The other four MSO tasks are uphold freedom of navigation, conduct maritime interdiction, fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and protect critical infrastructure.

¹⁶² "Operation Sea Guardian".

¹⁶³ Ibid.

- Different states have different definitions of terrorism and what constitutes a terrorist attack. How - and can? - these definitions and understandings be harmonised into one definition for NATO?
- What can NATO do to help countries that are currently experiencing political instability?
- How can political issues and obstacles - such as the Cyprus issue - be resolved?

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