

United Nations Security Council

Hamburg Model United Nations
“Shaping a New Era of Diplomacy”
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HAMMUN

Welcome Letter by the Secretary Generals

Dear Delegates,

we, the secretariat of HamMUN 2019, would like to give a warm welcome to all of you that have come from near and far to participate in the 21st Edition of Hamburg Model United Nations. We hope to give you an enriching and enlightening experience that you can look back on with joy.

Over the course of 4 days in total, you are going to try to find solutions for some of the most challenging problems our world faces today. Together with students from all over the world, you will hear opinions that might strongly differ from your own, or present your own divergent opinion. We hope that you take this opportunity to widen your horizon, to, in a respectful manner, challenge and be challenged and form new friendships.

With this year's slogan "Shaping a New Era of Democracy" we would like to invite you to engage in and develop peaceful ways to solve and prevent conflicts. To remain respectful and considerate in diplomatic negotiations in a time where we experience our political climate as rough, and to focus on what unites us rather than divides us. As we are moving towards an even more globalized and highly military armed world, facing unprecedented threats such as climate change and Nuclear Warfare, international cooperation has become more important than ever to ensure peace and stability.

During the last year our team has worked tirelessly to turn HamMUN into a platform for you, where you can grow as a person, step out of your comfort zone and be the best delegate you can possibly be. We can't wait to share it with you and are looking forward to an unforgettable time.

Yours Sincerely,

Leah Mathiesen & Tobias Hinderks

Secretary Generals



Introduction Letter by the Chairs

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to HamMUN 2019! We are pleased to welcome you to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We are both very excited to be your chairs for this year's edition of HamMUN.

The topics for this year's UNSC are: The Situation in the Sahel Region and Reviewing the UNSC's Role in the Sanctions and International Agreements Relating to Hong Kong.

When we chose these topics, we wanted to challenge you, the delegates, to tackle complicated and multifaceted situations and issues that would ask you to think outside the box. The Situation in the Sahel Region is a complex and multidimensional crisis that is currently occurring in an area of the world that is most vulnerable to its consequences, which is further complicated by the fact that the regional power relationships between the actors. This topic is a critical area of debate that desperately needs to be addressed by the international community. The topic on Hong Kong has been one of the most contentious and volatile situations to emerge this year. With the current situation only seeming set to worsen, it is vital that this is addressed by the international community. This study guide is not the only source of information at your disposal and we encourage you to do research outside of this study guide, both on the general topics of debate and of your individual country's position.

We look forward to productive debate during the conference and creative approaches in order to come up with solutions to the topics. We do expect that delegates be professional, respectful, and come willing to make the most out of their experience. Most importantly, we hope that you enjoy yourself and have a wonderful, fun experience in our committee.

We look forward to seeing you at the conference and to being your Chairs!

Your Chairpersons,

Kelli-Anne Tim & Zoe Braddick



Introduction to the Committee

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six main organs of the United Nations, and is charged with two main missions: the maintenance of international peace and security under the chapters V et VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and a substantial institutional role, having a role in the nomination of the members of the International Court of Justice, of the Secretary General of the United Nations and in the admission of new Member States to the United Nations¹.

It is composed of fifteen members: 5 permanent members (The Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America), also known as the “P5”; and 10 non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly taking into consideration the contribution of the said states to the actions of the United Nations and the need for an equitable geographical distribution.²

Under Section VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is the main organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security³. It takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or an act of aggression. Its first mission is to call upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and to recommend methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. The Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security⁴. Non-coercive sanctions-such as economic sanctions are stipulated under article 41, and coercive measures-such as military interventions are regulated by article 42 of the United Nations Charter.⁵

¹ "FAQ | United Nations Security Council", *Un.Org*, 2019, <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/faq>.

² *Ibid.*,

³ *Ibid.*,

⁴ *Ibid.*,

⁵ *Ibid.*,



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Topic A: The Situation in the Sahel Region

1. Introduction

The Special Adviser of the Secretary-General for the Sahel, at a December 2018 Security Council meeting, indicated that the Sahel is facing a wide variety of challenges and obstacles. Some of these challenges are food insecurity; extreme poverty; climate change affecting the environment; rapid population growth; weak government institutions and good governance; and rampant terrorism. Many of these challenges are interconnected as the conflict over natural resources can lead to discontent from the population, which can then result in criminal activities increasing. The Special Adviser has indicated that "criminal activities have reached levels that could threaten the stability and social fabric of States"⁶

Further since the Special Adviser addressed the Council, the situation in the region has deteriorated further with the effects affecting neighbouring countries such as Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo⁷. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported in June 2019 that "recurrent armed attacks and insecurity have now displaced more than 170,000 people"⁸ within Burkina Faso with an estimation that this number will increase to 200,000 before the end of the year. This is only one aspect of the situation as each of the countries in the region is experiencing the effects of the crisis within their own borders. The situation is at a critical point as the instability in the region can only be tackled by addressing the core challenges and problems that are causing this instability among a wide variety of areas.

In order to address the situation, the five countries, otherwise known as the Group of Five (G5), established a joint task force (FC-G5S), but it is severely underfunded and lacking in equipment, which limits their ability to address the situation effectively. Some of the other issues that prevent the task force from functioning is the tensions among the G5; basic and limited infrastructure; inadequate support methods and/or procedures; and ensuring the FC-G5S adhere

⁶ United Nations Security Council, "Peace in Sahel Requires Tackling Causes of Instability, Special Advisor Tells Security Council, amid Calls to Advance Development, Fight Terrorism," last modified December 20, 2018

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.



to international humanitarian law in their responses, which must be adhered to if the force were to have UN support⁹.

Previous actions such as the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel adopted in 2013 by the Security Council or the UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA), who's mandate has just been renewed as of 28 June 2019, have been implemented to address this situation. Yet, it is still not enough as the region continues to be plagued by many challenges, such as food insecurity and terrorist insurgence. Furthermore, individual countries have offered their aid to the G-5 Sahel Group (Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania), like Germany, who pledged millions in euros to them to help fight terrorism and improve their economies as of May 4th 2019. Yet, it is not sufficient enough for individual states to offer their support; this issue requires a unified response by the international community.

2. Historical Background and Current Challenges

The Sahel region is an area of Africa that spans approximately 3,860 kilometres east to west of the continent¹⁰. It is a landmass that forms the shape of an arc that rests south of the Sahara Desert and it made up mostly of semi-arid barren and sandy land¹¹. It is a region that forms the gap between the continent's tropical and desert regions. There are a variety of different geographical definitions of the Sahel, but it is commonly agreed upon to consist of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and Chad; though sometimes will also include Sudan and Eritrea¹². Beyond simply geographical definitions of the region, the Sahel region is also the bridge between the Islamic and Arabic culture and traditions from the north and the southern indigenous traditions and cultures¹³. To further understand the challenges within the Sahel region, this section of the guide will be broken down into the historical background and current challenges of each member of the G5 Sahel Group.

⁹ United Nations Security Council, "Peace in Sahel Requires Tackling Causes of Instability, Special Advisor Tells Security Council, amid Calls to Advance Development, Fight Terrorism," last modified December 20, 2018

¹⁰ Suleiman, Muhammad Dan. "Sahel Region, Africa." *The Conversation*, February 28, 2017. <https://theconversation.com/sahel-region-africa-72569>.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.



2.1. Mauritania

Mauritania is a country that is strongly influenced by the nomadic lifestyle of the Moorish Arabs and the sub-Saharan African traditions¹⁴. It has caravan routes that connect the Maghreb, the Niger and Senegal River valleys, which has become an axis for trade between Senegal and Morocco¹⁵. In fact, Mauritania has three key influences: “the Arab world, West Africa and the wider continent, and the West (particularly France and the European Union)”¹⁶. Beyond these external influences, Mauritania still has a strong nomadic tradition that permeates the society, especially the attitude towards the economy as majority of the population focuses more on inland means to build a livelihood¹⁷. These influences are a key aspect in the political environment of the country. This is especially true in the fact that tribes have a powerful impact on the government, which can sometimes lead to public contracts being given to those with connections rather than through an “open competitive tender”¹⁸. This is further exacerbated by the fact that Mauritania’s good governance and state institutions are weak¹⁹.

As with majority of the Sahelian nations, Mauritania has a large export sector for minerals and “hydrocarbons extraction”²⁰, which is contrasted with the smaller agriculture economy in the rural areas that is under pressure to provide livelihoods for the growing population²¹. The difficulty arises in the fact that the farmers do not have as much political capital as in other Sahel countries and they face similar difficulties in regards to how climate change is affecting the environment, which then affects food security²².

The challenges in agriculture, which are vulnerable to the effects of the climate change, create further problems of food insecurity. Yet, this is not the only are of the economy that presents challenges. The economy is also impacted by the rising population, which has steadily rose by

¹⁴ Melly , Paul. “Mauritania's Unfolding Landscape: Elections, Hydrocarbons and Socio-Economic Change .” *Africa Programme* , April 2019. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-04-10-Mauritania.pdf>.

¹⁵ Ibid., 11

¹⁶ Ibid., 11

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 7

¹⁹ Ibid., 7

²⁰ Ibid., 22

²¹ Ibid., 22

²² Ibid., 22



2.9% per year with 31% of the population between the ages of 10 and 24²³. According to the IMF, it is estimated that 31% of the population is in poverty²⁴, which indicates that Mauritania has developmental and social inequality challenges that need to be addressed. Although the government has taken some steps to address these challenges and issues, there is a strong indication that “the effectiveness of Mauritania’s national systems for monitoring crisis risk and sustaining community resilience lags significantly”²⁵. Furthermore, these steps, such as establishing official shops (EMEL) that sell basic essentials at lower prices, are not sufficient and often create resentment among certain areas of the population who believe to be neglected by the central government and ruling Maure elite²⁶. This is due to the fact that the agrarian communities do not have as much influence due to larger urban population²⁷.

In order to address the similar challenges affecting the Sahel region, Mauritania was one of the central players in the creation of the G5 Sahel Group as President Abdelaziz brought Chad, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger together in 2014²⁸. Mauritania continues to participate as an active member of the G5, which sought to create a “coordinated regional approach to tackling jihadist terrorist groups and trafficking gangs across the Sahel” and “the promotion of regional economic projects to tackle the social pressures that risk fuelling youth disenchantment and the appeal of radical ideology”²⁹. Yet despite this attempt at coordination between the Sahel region, Mauritania has complicated relationships with certain West African neighbours like Mali and Senegal, which makes it difficult for the G5 to fully function as a coordinated body³⁰.

2.2. Chad

The Republic of Chad is located between sub-Saharan Africa and Maghreb as well as between the western and eastern Sahel regions³¹. The capital, N’Djamena, and Lake Chad are located in

²³ Melly , Paul. “Mauritania's Unfolding Landscape: Elections, Hydrocarbons and Socio-Economic Change .” *Africa Programme* , April 2019. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2019-04-10-Mauritania.pdf>.

²⁴ Ibid., 25

²⁵ Ibid., 27

²⁶ Ibid., 28

²⁷ Ibid., 28

²⁸ Ibid., 13

²⁹ Ibid., 14

³⁰ Ibid., 14

³¹ Crisis Group. *Chad: Defusing Tensions in the Sahel*. [online], December 2018. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/266-tchad-desamorcer-les-tensions-dans-la-bande-sahelienne>.



the Sahel region while a third of its territory is located in the Sahara Desert³². The country has its roots in nomadic lifestyles and follow the Islamic religion³³. This influence from the nomadic communities has resulted in majority of the lifestyles of the population to be based in agriculture focused on “crops in the sand dunes and low-lying areas, livestock farming, and nomadic herding”³⁴.

Recently there has been a growth in the oil industry, which has increased the political elite’s wealth and caused discontent between the elite and the locals as they believe the elite to have a strong influence over the government³⁵. This is further emphasized by the fact that majority of the power within the government is concentrated in the President’s ethnic group even though there has been a broadening of power to other ethnic groups within the country³⁶. The government also is instable because of the constant reshuffling of the ministers and short-term contracts for governor positions³⁷. This level of instability within the government has only exacerbated the tensions between the local authorities and the populations, especially the youth³⁸.

The instability of the government is not the only challenge for the country, but it also suffers from similar challenges as the rest of the Sahel region: “deep-rooted gender inequalities, lack of public investment in basic services and the relative absence of humanitarian and development organisations”³⁹. Beyond these challenges, the Republic of Chad also has a “chronic malnutrition crisis” that has not improved in the last 15 years⁴⁰. These challenges, along with the economic crisis, which has arisen due to the effect of the 2014 drop in oil price and has left 39.8% of the population in poverty⁴¹, have left the country in a difficult position. The precarious

³² U.S Geological Survey, “The Republic of Chad,” <https://eros.usgs.gov/westafrika/country/republic-chad>

³³ Crisis Group. *Chad: Defusing Tensions in the Sahel*. [online], December 2018. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/266-tchad-desamorcer-les-tensions-dans-la-bande-sahelienne>.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ The World Bank, “The World Bank in Chad,” last modified May 17, 2018, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/chad/overview>



situation has increased the amount of young men who are leaving for countries such as Libya in order to find work, which has led to some cases where they are engaging in activities such as mercenary work in rebel movements⁴²

2.3. Burkina Faso

A landlocked country with Mali, Niger, Benin, Togo, Ghana and the Ivory Coast surrounding it, Burkina Faso has its history in a migration traditional lifestyle. It was during the French colonial period that Burkina Faso became more dependent on “rain-fed agriculture” that is often affected by the changes in climate⁴³. In accordance with agriculture as its main economic provider, approximately 80% of the population works in that sector, which indicates that not only the industry is affected, but also the level of employment within the country⁴⁴. This is further affected by a young population with more than 65% of it under 25, which is the result of a high fertility rate and a decreasing mortality rate⁴⁵. The economic downturn has affected much of the population as 40% live below the poverty line, which could continue to increase as the price of goods also continue to rise⁴⁶. This has created a growing dissatisfaction among the population, especially with the rising food insecurity that is plaguing the country along with other challenges.

According to the World Food Programme, it is estimated that 400,000 people are experiencing some form of food insecurity and that approximately 688,000 people are at risk from June 2019 onwards⁴⁷. This food crisis is further exacerbated by the fact that there are around 25,000 Malian refugees, who have fled from Mali because of the security issues within the neighbouring

⁴² Crisis Group. *Chad: Defusing Tensions in the Sahel*. [online], December 2018. Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/chad/266-tchad-desamorcer-les-tensions-dans-la-bande-sahelienne>.

⁴³ The World Bank, “The World Bank in Burkina Faso,” last modified March 22, 2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/burkinafaso/overview>

⁴⁴ Ibid.,

⁴⁵ Crisis Group, “Tackling Burkina Faso’s Insurgencies and Unrest.” Africa. January 28, 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/tackling-burkina-fasos-insurgencies-and-unrest>

⁴⁶ Ibid.,

⁴⁷ World Food Programme, “WFP Burkina Faso Country Brief,” WFP Country Strategy, May 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP%20COUNTRY%20BRIEF%20BURKINA%20FASO%20MAY%202019.pdf>



Sahelian nation, within the country⁴⁸. These are some of the challenges that Burkina Faso is facing, yet the government has struggled to properly address these issues.

The government, under President Kaboré, has also the insurgencies that have been attacking from the north and the east⁴⁹. These insurgencies have been incited by the militant group called Ansarul Islam from the north and the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), since 2018, from the east⁵⁰. The situation has become dire as the government and state authorities have lost control of certain areas of the country where “insurgents can openly gather villagers to preach and demonstrate their influence”⁵¹. These insurgents prey on the social discontent that underlines much of Burkina Faso’s society. This is even more apparent in the fact that the country’s armed forces have structural problems that include: “lack of communication among different ranks; rivalry among agencies; poor training; shortages of aircraft and other forms of transport; and an insufficient number of troops”⁵². These are further reflected in the G5 force’s lack of cohesion as there were attacks in 2018 on Burkina Faso’s borders, but there was no joint mission to counter the insurgent attacks⁵³. There needs to be a more coordinated response by the G5 force if these insurgencies are going to be stopped.

2.4. Mali

One of the largest countries south of the Sahara, Mali is a landlocked country with majority of its territory in desert landscape, which has left a large percentage of the population to reside in the southern area and along the Niger River⁵⁴. It is a country that has struggled to provide basic services to its population, such as “health, education, portable water and electricity”⁵⁵. This is

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Crisis Group, “Tackling Burkina Faso’s Insurgencies and Unrest.” Africa. January 28, 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/tackling-burkina-fasos-insurgencies-and-unrest>

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Crisis Group, “Tackling Burkina Faso’s Insurgencies and Unrest.” Africa. January 28, 2019, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso/tackling-burkina-fasos-insurgencies-and-unrest>

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Moussa Djiré, Djibril Sow, Kissima Gakou, and Bakary Camara, “Assessing the EU’s conflict prevention and Peacebuilding interventions in Mali,” Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, (March 2017): 2 – 58, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/142348/2917218/Assessing%20the%20EU's%20conflict%20prevention%20and%20peacebuilding%20interventions%20in%20Mali.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 8



perhaps reflective in the transition from colonialism that Mali experienced from the 1960's where regimes maintained control of the country until 1991.

It was from 1991 onwards that Mali made the shift to democracy and was considered a model of democracy⁵⁶ until the March 2012 when the Malian president was overthrown by a military coup and the northern section of the country was declared an independent state of Azawad under the control of the National Liberation Movement of Azawad (MNLA)⁵⁷. The French government intervened in 2013 when Jihadist groups took control of the Mopti region⁵⁸. The threat of the Jihadists forced the government and the MNLA to reach a peace agreement, yet the country still remains fractured as the two sides are divided on the implementation of the conditions⁵⁹. This is further perpetrated by the fact that Jihadist groups continue to attack the country, which is a recurring security challenge for the Sahel region⁶⁰.

The security threats are not the only element that has deepened the crisis in the country. The economy in Mali is similar to the rest of the Sahel region in that it is mainly focused on agriculture with some focus on cotton and gold exports, but the cotton and gold industry is unable to “offset the increase in oil imports”⁶¹. Furthermore, the country has a disproportionate amount of wealth distribution as “poverty is much lower in urban areas, with 90% of all poor living in rural areas”⁶². This extreme poverty in the rural regions is further exacerbated by the growing scarcity of resources and this creates tension between the farmers and the herders within the country⁶³.

⁵⁶ Moussa Djiré, Djibril Sow, Kissima Gakou, and Bakary Camara, “Assessing the EU’s conflict prevention and Peacebuilding interventions in Mali,” *Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding*, (March 2017): 11, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/download/142348/2917218/Assessing%20the%20EU's%20conflict%20prevention%20and%20peacebuilding%20interventions%20in%20Mali.pdf>.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 15

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 16

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 16

⁶¹ The World Bank, “The World Bank in Mali,” last modified June 06, 2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mali/overview>

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ International Committee of the Red Cross, “Mali-Niger: Climate Change and Conflict Make an Explosive Mix in the Sahel,” last modified January 22, 2019, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/mali-niger-climate-change-and-conflict-make-explosive-mix-sahel>



These challenges are difficult to address due to the fact that there is still insecurity in regards to the government's authority, which has created an institutional crisis, and the presence of armed Jihadist groups in the north, which has created a security crisis. These elements make it difficult for the government to address the economic situation as well as the environmental challenges that are imposed by climate change. Although, there has been international response to this situation since 2013, the challenges in Mali are a reflection of the growing crisis that exists within the Sahel region.

2.5. Niger

Similar to the rest of the Sahel region, Niger is a landlocked country, bordering Algeria, Chad, Benin, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali and Nigeria, that is dependent on rain-fed agriculture due to the fact that “less than 12 percent of the land is arable” and located along the southern border of the country⁶⁴. It is, therefore, the reason that 87% of the population is employed within the farming industry as it accounts for 40% of the gross domestic product (GDP)⁶⁵. It has been in recent years that Niger's economy has become more focused on mineral exports, but agriculture is still a large part of the country's economic growth⁶⁶. Unfortunately, Niger's agricultural production has not grown and has left the country relying on food imports, which affects its economy and overall wealth of the country⁶⁷. Yet Niger's dependency on agriculture is not a problem as much as it is constantly affected by the security and environmental challenges that the region faces.

In comparison to many of the country's neighbours, Niger has had a rather stable political climate since 2017, but has increasingly come under threat due to the jihadist militants who have been attacking the Tillaberi region that has spread from the conflict in Mali⁶⁸; and the Boko Haram supporters, who have taken refuge in the Diffa Region, who have ties with the Islamic State⁶⁹. Niger has managed to content with these threats with a “standard of security

⁶⁴ Cullen S. Hendrix, “Research Brief: Water and Security in Niger and the Sahel,” *Climate Change and African Political Stability*, no 24 (December 2014: 1 – 8

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 8

⁶⁷ Ibid., 8

⁶⁸ Stratfor, “As Growing Militancy in the Sahel Encroaches, Can Niger Hold Strong?,” July 19, 2019, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/growing-militancy-sahel-encroaches-can-niger-hold-strong>

⁶⁹ Dr. Mamadou Bodian, Dr. Gregory Chauzal, Louise Edgren, Annelies Hickendorff, “Chad and Niger,” SIPRI: Conflict, Peace and Security



greater than its various neighbours”, but it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain a sense of stable security⁷⁰.

Overall, Niger is located in a precarious position as it contends with a variety of threats from all sides of its borders as Jihadist militants attempt to force the conflict to spread further into the Sahel region. Yet, Niger is not only in a position to have the conflict spread further into its borders from its neighbours, but it is also a key location for these militant groups to make the country a “focal point” for their operations⁷¹. Niger has received help from Western countries and has been able to conduct “active combat operations against jihadists, gathering intelligence, conducting logistics support and training and equipping Niger’s own security forces”⁷². This, along with their role in the G5 Sahel group, has kept these security threats from spilling further into the country, but as violence from the west continues to grow, Niger remains under threat.

3. The Group of Five for the Sahel & Their Challenges

The Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) was founded in 2014 by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in an effort to address the security and developmental challenges that the region is facing⁷³. The aim of the G5 Sahel was to create the opportunity to have a coordinated response to the challenges and to address the issues of development, governance, and security⁷⁴. The Priority Investment Program (PIP) was established in order to “coordinate development projects” in sectors such as “security, democratisation, popular participation, infrastructure, food security and pastoralism, human development, climate change adaptation, and water resources’ management”⁷⁵. Beyond this program, a key focal point of the G5 Sahel is the G5

⁷⁰ Stratfor, “As Growing Militancy in the Sahel Encroaches, Can Niger Hold Strong?”, July 19, 2019, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/growing-militancy-sahel-encroaches-can-niger-hold-strong>

⁷¹ Stratfor, “As Growing Militancy in the Sahel Encroaches, Can Niger Hold Strong?”, July 19, 2019, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/growing-militancy-sahel-encroaches-can-niger-hold-strong>

⁷² Ibid.,

⁷³ Eloïse Bertrand and Nic Cheeseman, “Understanding the G5: Governance, Development and Security in the Sahel,” OPEN Publications, vol 3. no. 2 (Spring 2019): 3, <https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/open201902-understanding-g5-sahel.pdf>

⁷⁴ Eloïse Bertrand and Nic Cheeseman, “Understanding the G5: Governance, Development and Security in the Sahel,” OPEN Publications, vol 3. no. 2 (Spring 2019): 3, <https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/open201902-understanding-g5-sahel.pdf>

⁷⁵ Ibid., 8



Joint Force (FC-G5S), which was established in 2017, that aims at restoring the peace and security of the region by combating the multifaceted threats⁷⁶.

The FC-G5S has gained much prominence among the international community as many external nation states as well as the United Nations Security Council have offered their support and made the joint force a focal point in the strategy to combat the crisis in the region. The FC-G5S has coordinated “50,000 military personnel, police officers, gendarmes and border patrol agents from the five states”⁷⁷ and they will operate in the “Liptako-Gourma transborder area, the Mali-Mauritania border area ... and the Lake Chad Basin region”⁷⁸. In general, the FC-G5S is a task force that seeks to unburden the member state’s individual strain from having to combat many of the violent insurgencies that often come from many fronts⁷⁹. Furthermore, the mandate of the FC-G5S is focused on “countering terrorism, illicit trafficking, and migration”, which can sometimes be prioritised instead of the long term solutions that deal with development, the environmental crisis, food insecurity etc.

Overall, the G5 Sahel is an effort to coordinate a strong response against the threat of terrorism by filling in the gaps that are left by the national forces with a focus on regional zones that are harder to access or outside of the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)⁸⁰. Yet even this response has left consequences that only seek to fuel the root causes of the conflict. Many of the state of emergency responses by the G5 Sahel have created a problem of displacement and unemployment as “forced resettlements in the region have left tens of thousands of people without livelihoods.”⁸¹ Other unforeseen consequences is how that has left the local population sometimes in the hands of the militant groups as certain bans in an effort to fight these groups have impeded access to resources⁸².

⁷⁶ Ibid., 8

⁷⁷ Zoë Gorman, “Pursuing Elusive Stability in the Sahel,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, March 26, 2019

⁷⁸ Zoë Gorman, “Pursuing Elusive Stability in the Sahel,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, March 26, 2019

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Zoë Gorman, “Pursuing Elusive Stability in the Sahel,” *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, March 26, 2019

⁸² Ibid.,



The G5 Sahel has its own challenges within the organisation that have made it even more difficult for the group to be able to address the external challenges that the region faces. Part of the problem is the fact that many of the countries in the group have varying relationships that sometimes impede in the process, such as internal rivalries that halt the decision-making process⁸³. An example of these tensions is the rivalry between Mauritania and Chad in regards to their military and the resources attached to that⁸⁴. These regional tensions are further reflected in the fact that there is a lack of coordination between the G5 Sahel and the international actors, and MINUSMA who are supporting the group.

4. Areas of Discussion

4.1. Reducing Inequality

As indicated in the previous section, the majority of the Sahel region suffers from inequality in areas of economic, social and political realms. This is particularly evident in the fact that a large majority of the population in the Sahel region experiences “unequal access to healthcare and quality education”⁸⁵. An example of this is Chad, where there are fewer healthcare workers in rural areas, which contrasts drastically with the amount of population that lives in the rural regions of the country⁸⁶. Another area of inequality that only fuels the cycle of inequality is the education system. There are many sections of the region where families are unable to send their children to school, especially girls, as the “economic situation of the family” determines whether they can go to school⁸⁷. There is also a great difference in the amount of services available to the nomadic populations of the Sahel region as many of these services are inaccessible to them as it does not suit their way of life⁸⁸. Food scarcity is another area that is affected by the economic inequality that plagues the region where “hunger primarily affects the

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Jean Denis Crola, “Sahel: Fighting Inequality to Respond to Development and Security Challenges,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, July 2019: 5

⁸⁶ Ibid., 10

⁸⁷ Jean Denis Crola, “Sahel: Fighting Inequality to Respond to Development and Security Challenges,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, July 2019: 5

⁸⁸ Jean Denis Crola, “Sahel: Fighting Inequality to Respond to Development and Security Challenges,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, July 2019: 10



poorest communities, who do not have access to land or other productive resources” and where they are unable to access enough healthy food, which means that they have to depend on aid⁸⁹.

4.2. Improving Good Governance & Social Development

The Sahel region is also challenged by a lack of strong governmental institutions. Throughout a majority of the region, there are problems of corruption, weak party systems, fragile political systems and a lack of strong bureaucracy⁹⁰. The weak government institutions only perpetuates the weakening security in the region because without strong accountability mechanisms and “constitutional checks and balances”⁹¹, it is difficult for the governments to be able to reach consensus in order to formulate and implement these policies⁹². It only makes it more difficult to address the security challenges and the humanitarian crisis that exists in the region. Furthermore, the lack of a dependable government continues to exacerbate the social discontent from the population as their lifestyles continue to decrease in quality and they are forced to flee their homes⁹³. In contrast, good governance will enable the region to improve the social development of its citizens, and will also enable the building of infrastructure and societal services that can be accessed by the entire population.

4.3. Climate Change Adaptation

According to the GAIN Index, the Sahel region is the most vulnerable to climate change and the consequences⁹⁴. This is already evident as the entire region has become “drier and hotter, with temperatures rising faster than the global average and average precipitation decreasing throughout the countries”⁹⁵. The consequences of these changes in climate are that there is a decrease in the distribution of rainfall, which affects the agricultural industry within the

⁸⁹ Ibid., 10

⁹⁰ Eloïse Bertrand and Nic Cheeseman, “Understanding the G5: Governance, Development and Security in the Sahel,” OPEN Publications, vol 3. no. 2 (Spring 2019): 3, <https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/open201902-understanding-g5-sahel.pdf>

⁹¹ Ibid., 18

⁹² Ibid., 18

⁹³ Eloïse Bertrand and Nic Cheeseman, “Understanding the G5: Governance, Development and Security in the Sahel,” OPEN Publications, vol 3. no. 2 (Spring 2019): 3, <https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/open201902-understanding-g5-sahel.pdf>

⁹⁴ Jean Denis Crola, “Sahel: Fighting Inequality to Respond to Development and Security Challenges,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, July 2019: 5

⁹⁵ Ibid., 31



countries and leads to food insecurity and unemployment⁹⁶. It is also creating situations of displacement where cities are becoming flooded because of the change in frequency of rainfall, which leads to populations having to leave their homes⁹⁷. An example of this is in Ouagadougou City where 15,000 people were forced to leave their homes when it flooded in 2009⁹⁸.

	Emission % (global) ⁹	Emissions Rank ⁹ (215 countries)	Rank Per Capita Emissions ¹⁰ (188 countries)	ND-Gain Index ¹¹ (181 countries)
Burkina Faso	0.05	142	175	164 14 th most vulnerable. 35 th least ready
Chad	0.06	172	187	180 3 rd most vulnerable. 4 th least ready
Mali	0.06	159	182	166 9 th most vulnerable. 43 rd least ready
Mauritania	0.02	143	141	154 23 rd most vulnerable. 42 nd least ready
Niger	0.06	152	179	175 #1 most vulnerable. 46 th least ready

Source: *Climate Change Profile: West African Sahel, MOFA, Netherlands (2018)*⁹⁹

Now, it is estimated that there are approximately 13,600 internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the Sahel region¹⁰⁰. The consequences of climate change are also affecting the populations of the region in different ways. Majority of the time, it is the most vulnerable populations who are suffering from the changes as their livelihoods and communities are being affected¹⁰¹. This is also particularly true in the way that the changes in climate are affecting the access to and ownership of land and other resources, which creates its own tensions and discontent within country as well as creating conflict between farmers and pastoralists or different ethnic backgrounds¹⁰². These conflicts have resulted in many deaths in the Sahel countries such as Mali and Chad¹⁰³. It is important, therefore, that the governments are able to manage the natural resources and the access to land as the climate continues to change in drastic and degrading ways.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 31

⁹⁷ Ibid., 31

⁹⁸ Ibid., 31

⁹⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Netherlands (2018): *Climate Change Profile: West African Sahel*.
<https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/publications/2019/02/05/climate-change-profiles/West+African+Sahel.pdf>

¹⁰⁰ World Food Programme, “WFP Burkina Faso Country Brief,” WFP Country Strategy, May 2019,
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP%20COUNTRY%20BRIEF%20BURKINA%20FASO%20MAY%202019.pdf>

¹⁰¹ Jean Denis Crola, “Sahel: Fighting Inequality to Respond to Development and Security Challenges,” Oxfam Briefing Paper, July 2019: 27

¹⁰² Ibid., 27

¹⁰³ Ibid., 32



5. The United Nation's Response: the Security Council (UNSC)

The main response by the UNSC to the situation in the Sahel region has been through its MINUSMA, which has a large multidimensional mandate to implement the peace agreement in Mali as well as assist in other areas of development and institutional building¹⁰⁴. Much of the UNSC's focus has been on Mali, though there have been some resolutions passed in 2017 that are focused on the G5 Sahel joint force. Other than that, there is the United Nations Strategy for the Sahel, which was adopted in 2013, in order to “promote governance, security and resilience”¹⁰⁵. This, unfortunately, has had limited success because of the difficulty of creating a coherent and integrated mechanism due to the variety of agencies and bureaucracies that need to be involved¹⁰⁶.

In 2018, the UNSC was briefed on the FC-G5S in regards to when it would become operational and the challenges that still needed to be overcome.¹⁰⁷ As of March 2019, the UNSC authorized a mission to Mali and Burkina Faso where they were focused on implementing the peace agreement in the former while also looking into the G5 Sahel and Burkina Faso¹⁰⁸. The conclusion, based on the statement by the representative of France to the UNSC, was that there needed to be a focus on “the priority goals of the constitutional review process, defining a comprehensive plan and a clear timeline for the redeployment of the Malian armed forces to the north of the country, and creating a special development area for the North End”¹⁰⁹. Although these are good steps towards implementing the first aspect of addressing the situation, there needs to be a more multidimensional response by the UNSC. The emphasis on implementing the Malian peace agreement might ensure a stronger response by the Mali government in regards to the security threats by the Jihadist groups, but the Sahel region as a whole is a complicated and multifaceted crisis that needs to be addressed in the same manner.

¹⁰⁴ Eloïse Bertrand and Nic Cheeseman, “Understanding the G5: Governance, Development and Security in the Sahel,” OPEN Publications, vol 3. no. 2 (Spring 2019): 3, <https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/open201902-understanding-g5-sahel.pdf>

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 13

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 13 – 14

¹⁰⁷ Security Council Report, “West Africa and the Sahel: January 2019 Monthly Forecast,” last modified: December 27. 2018

¹⁰⁸ François Delattre, “UN Security Council Mission to Sahel Statement,” Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Security Council, March 27, 2019

¹⁰⁹ François Delattre, “UN Security Council Mission to Sahel Statement,” Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Security Council, March 27, 2019



6. Conclusion

There is a wide variety of aspects to this crisis in the Sahel region. These are challenges and crises that seem to perpetrate each other in a cyclical fashion, but at the core of the situation in the Sahel region is that a long term solution needs to be implemented by the Sahelian countries. This must also be encouraged and supported by the international community because the current response seems to be focused upon the external threats within the region, which perhaps is only perpetrated by the underlying developmental core issues. Without a response that addresses all the aspects of this crisis, the Sahel region will continue to experience this crisis and it is entirely probable that the situation will even deteriorate.



7. Further Reading

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Topic B: Reviewing the UNSC's Role in the Sanctions and International Agreements Relating to Hong Kong

1. Introduction

Over the past few months, Hong Kong has been sat at the centre of the news due to the increased rise in protests and difficult internal relations with China. This combined with the heightened attention around its handling of potential breaches of United Nations Security Council Sanctions, has meant that there is significant focus on the actions of Hong Kong from the international community.

While this has not been a topic that has been brought to the Security Council as of yet, with the end of these protests not yet in sight despite the removal of the initial bill, this is an issue set to become the forefront of the Security Council agenda.

Sovereignty, Right to Protect, Identity and Independence, are all issues of great concern for this issue and should be looked at in great detail when addressing the topic.

2. Historical Background and Current Issues

2.1. Hong Kong and China

Hong Kong and China have shared a long and complicated history, which came to a head in June 2019 with the Hong Kong protests. These were initially based on pro-democracy groups' opposition to the Extradition Bill. This would have allowed criminal suspects to be extradited from Hong Kong to mainland China and was proposed in April before being suspended in late July and then finally withdrawn in September. However, these protests have later spread to reflect the demands for wider reform that is causing millions to join in the protests as they stand.

One of the main reasons for this complex relationship is the special status that Hong Kong holds regarding China.¹¹⁰ Hong Kong Island was separated from mainland China in 1842, when it was ceded to the UK following the end of the First Opium war.

Fifty years later, China leased the rest of Hong Kong, otherwise known as the New Territories, to the UK for a duration of 99 years.

¹¹⁰ "How Hong Kong's Complex History Explains Its Current Crisis With China" 2019



As a result, Hong Kong became a busy trading port, and in the 1950s, took off economically as a central hub for manufacturing.¹¹¹ It was also a highly popular area for migrants and other dissidents who were fleeing mainland china due to instability, poverty or persecution with nearly 23,000 illegal immigrants entering Hong Kong between 1978 and 1980.

The situation became more complex as the 99 year lease approached its end, beginning serious talks over the future of Hong Kong, with the communist government in China requesting that the entirety of Hong Kong should be returned to Chinese rule.¹¹² This led to the Sino-British joint Declaration in 1984, which agreed that Hong Kong would return to China in 1997, under the concept of “One country, two systems”. This would allow for a “higher degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs”¹¹³ to be held in Hong Kong for the following 50 years, while simultaneously becoming part of one country with China.

Due to this, Hong Kong maintained its own legal system and its borders, with certain rights – such as Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Assembly - being allowed in Hong Kong. One example of this is the ability for people to commemorate the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown within Chinese territory.¹¹⁴

However, these protected characteristics of Hong Kong could be on the decline.¹¹⁵ Human Rights groups have made accusations about China meddling in the Hong Kong system, quoting examples of pro-democracy legislators who have been disqualified under legal rulings. There is also widespread concern with people going missing such as five Hong Kong booksellers¹¹⁶ and a Tycoon, who all were eventually found within the custody of China.

This is corroborated by artists and writers who have complained of an increased requirement to self-censor,¹¹⁷ and a Financial Times Journalist who was unable to enter Hong Kong after the discovery that an independence activist was featured at an event that he was hosting.¹¹⁸

¹¹¹ "The Background You Need On The Hong Kong Protests" 2019

¹¹² Ibid, 118

¹¹³ "1.2. Hong Kong Government Official Documents" 2014

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 118

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 118

¹¹⁶ "Hong Kong Bookseller Disappearances | South China Morning Post" 2019

¹¹⁷ "Is Artistic Freedom Eroding In Hong Kong? For Some, Without A Doubt" 2019

¹¹⁸ "FT Journalist Denied Entry Into Hong Kong, Newspaper Says" 2019



Democratic form has been another area of contention. The Chief executive position, the leader of Hong Kong (currently Ms. Carrie Lam), is elected by a committee of 1,200 members. This committee only consists of 6% of eligible voters and is considered to be mostly pro-Beijing in attitude. There is also concern as not all of the 70 members of Hong Kong's Legislative Council, the lawmaking body, are democratically elected by Hong Kong's voters, with the unelected seats primarily being taken by pro-Beijing lawmakers. Some members have even been barred post-election after a controversial legal ruling from Beijing, which had nullified their nomination.

Hong Kong has its own domestic constitution, known as the Basic Law,¹¹⁹ requires that both the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council should be elected in a more democratic manner, but there is no current agreement over the method of implementation. The Chinese government offered voters the ability to select from a list that had been pre-approved by a pro-Beijing committee. However, critics descried this as a sham of democracy,¹²⁰ voting it down when it was proposed to be included into the legislature of Hong Kong. It is important to note though, that the Basic Law is only in existence up until the end of 2047 with the fate of the autonomy of Hong Kong being unclear after this point.¹²¹

2.2. Hong Kong and UNSC Sanctions

On the 23rd January 2019, the Hong Kong Government issued a press release, publishing the latest statistics on the investigations into the number of sanctions and other enforcement related actions that had been undertaken by the Hong Kong Government. The main focus of this were the potential breaches of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions that had occurred over the previous five years in relation to Hong Kong, and how many staff had been committed to working on such investigations. This was done in collaboration with Acting Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development Dr. Bernard Chan and in response to a query from lawmaker, the Hon. Kenneth Leung.

This release went into detail on the structure of the governmental departments who were involved in the enforcing of the United Nations Sanctions Ordinance (the "Ordinance"). This taskforce

¹¹⁹ "Basic Law Full Text" 2019

¹²⁰ Ibid, 118

¹²¹ Ibid, 126



consisted of a combination of the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) and the Customs and Excise Department (C&ED). While a significantly detailed breakdown of manpower in each individual area was not available, it did state that there was a workforce of 69 staff within the HKPF and another 47 who were hired in C&ED with duties including enforcement review and for action that has arisen out of the ordinance.¹²²

In relation to the investigation statistics, they have been confirmed by the HKPF to have increased between 2014 and 2018 from 3 to 201 investigations running, with C&ED increasing from 10 to 99 between the same years. While this shows a clear and unarguable increase in the number of sanctions investigations, this does not explain the reasoning behind such an increase. Simultaneously, this increase in investigations has not been matched by a similar number of prosecutions, with no prosecutions having been brought under the Ordinance at the point of the press release.¹²³

Outside of this complete lack of any prosecutions, the press release confirms that 'Hong Kong has a robust system to implement sanctions imposed by the UNSC'¹²⁴ with the work of the HKPF and the C&ED having acted as a deterrent to any potential violators. This is due to the actions of the government (as mentioned in the press release): a number of companies that are registered in Hong Kong were struck off, and vessels have been barred from entering the waters of Hong Kong. The press release further mentions how the HKPF and the C&ED are actively looking for any suspected violations of the sanctions in question, and would follow up 'without fear or favour'¹²⁵ and would institute prosecution where there were sufficient evidence.

Further on, the press release highlights the importance and the role of the Hong Kong Government in upholding the sanctions that have been implemented by the UNSC, especially in regards to the specific 14 places and 2 organisations. However, they also made clear that while countries were able to impose their own unilateral sanctions, the Hong Kong government

¹²² "Implementation Of United Nations Security Council Sanctions By The Hong Kong Authorities - International Law - Hong Kong" 2019

¹²³ Ibid, 129

¹²⁴ Ibid, 129

¹²⁵ Ibid, 129



'does not have the responsibility nor the authority to enforce these unilateral sanctions or investigate related cases'¹²⁶.

These comments are specifically pertinent due to the arrest of Huawei's Chief Financial Officer Sabrina Meng Wanzhou at the request of US authorities on allegations of the company's dealings with UNSC-sanctioned Iran, through a Hong Kong shell company. The Deputy Secretary of Commerce and Economic Development Bureau for Hong Kong, Vivian Sum Fong-Kwang, told legislators shortly before the press release that 'Hong Kong is not obliged to enforce sanctions imposed by the United States', and 'the city government would only act on sanctions ordered by the UN Security Council, and would not enforce unilateral sanctions by individual jurisdictions, including the US or the European Union'¹²⁷. However, with no prosecutions having been made, whether Meng Wanzhou and Huawei would fall under the UNSC restrictions is yet to be seen.

Other areas where sanctions caused media coverage was in November 2017, due to the Hong Kong Government's response to the Hong Kong registered vessel which was detained by the authorities in South Korean authorities. They accused the vessel of transferring oil to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which is one of the main territories that are under the UNSC-sanctions regime. The case is now the subject of judicial review proceedings, due to be heard in early 2019.¹²⁸

With there being an increased focus on sanctions enforcement, both in Hong Kong and abroad, along with the Huawei case, there is additional scrutiny on the Hong Kong government and their actions in the response to any alleged breaches of the UNSC sanctions. Given the history, it is likely that various forms of deterrent tactics will continue to be deployed by the government as alongside the strengthening of their enforcement capabilities. With these investigations trending upwards at a significant rate, there will be closer scrutiny if prosecutions also start to trend in a similar manner.

¹²⁶ "LCQ2: Implementation Of Sanctions Imposed By United Nations Security Council" 2019

¹²⁷ "Hong Kong 'Not Obligated To Enforce Sanctions Imposed By US Alone'" 2019

¹²⁸ "Lawsuit Filed Over Hong Kong 'Failure' To Retrieve Ship Held In Korea" 2019



2.3. History of Protests

Protests in Hong Kong are highly regular, with them having made up a significant part of the history of the country. A series of demonstrations following the increase in fares by the Star Ferry Company started 1966; the protests quickly escalated into riots, causing the enactment of a full curfew and hundreds of troops being stationed on the streets.¹²⁹

Since the handover from the UK to China, protests have become increasingly common, with many of them tending to be of a political nature, and usually conflict with the position of mainland China. This is mainly due to the lack of autonomy that those in Hong Kong have, especially in regard to the polls.¹³⁰ This has pushed many to use protests as their expression of opinion in general.

Large protests occurred in 2003, as 500,000 people came to the event,¹³¹ leading to a controversial security bill being shelved, and there were annual marches for memorials for the Tiananmen Square crackdown and universal suffrage, all of which were highly anticipated events.

The last main political protests took place in 2014 with the so called “Umbrella Movement”¹³² demanding the right to elect their own leader. Despite taking place over several weeks, this movement eventually faded with Beijing having given no changes or concessions to the protestors. However, the statement that “We’ll be back”, chanted by the protestors as their pro-democracy protest site was dismantled in central Hong Kong, has become more accurate with these most recent protests.¹³³

3. Timelines

3.1. Hong Kong and UNSC Sanctions

August 2018

- 22nd August: A New York court issues a warrant pertaining to the financial officer of Huawei Technologies chief, Meng Wanzhou.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 118

¹³⁰ Ibid, 118

¹³¹ "Protests In Hong Kong: A Brief History" 2019

¹³² Ibid, 131

¹³³ Ibid, 118



December 2018

- 1st December: Meng is arrested by Canadian Authorities at Vancouver airport during her layover between Hong Kong to Mexico.
- 5th December: The news of the arrest is made public, and that it is an extradition request from the Americans.
- 6th December: China demands the release of Meng from Canada, and to “immediately correct the mistake” officials made in arresting her. They state that they were not briefed on the reasons behind the arrest of Meng.

January 2019

- 23rd January: The Hong Kong government releases information referring to their current actions in combatting the potential violations of the United Nations Security Council Sanctions, specifically in reference to DPRK and Iran.¹³⁴

3.2. Hong Kong and China

April 2019

- 3rd April: The Government of Hong Kong introduce plans for changed legislation to allow criminal suspects to have the potential to be extradited to China¹³⁵. Critics warned that this could undermine the legal freedoms that Hong Kong holds and would be able to be used to intimidate or silence dissidents.¹³⁶

June 2019

- 9th June: One million people march in a generally peaceful protest, to show their opposition to the proposed bill. The march to the government headquarters had some small skirmishes but no more than that.¹³⁷
- 12th June: A new demonstration took place. Initially this started as a peaceful demonstration, but tear gas and rubber bullets were fired

¹³⁴ "LCQ2: Implementation Of Sanctions Imposed By United Nations Security Council" 2019

¹³⁵ "Hong Kong Launches New Extradition Laws Despite Opposition" 2019

¹³⁶ "A Draft Bill Would Allow Hong Kong To Hand Suspects To China'S Police" 2019

¹³⁷ "Over A Million Attend Hong Kong Demo Against Controversial Extradition Law, Organisers Say | Hong Kong Free Press HKFP" 2019



by the police and the stand-off developed into the worst violence in decades for Hong Kong.

- 15th June: The leader of Hong Kong, Carrie Lam, issued a response, saying that she would indefinitely delay the extradition bill, expressing deep sorrow over the extradition law controversy.¹³⁸
- 16th June: Despite the previous day's announcement, two million took to the streets with a demand that the bill would be withdrawn completely and that Ms. Lam would resign.¹³⁹
- 21st June: With resentment growing over the actions of the police, protesters blockaded police headquarters for 15 hours.¹⁴⁰ With this march, an additional demand was included: that those who were arrested during previous protests should be exonerated.

July 2019

- 1st July: With the anniversary of Hong Kong's handover to China from the UK, there was a storming by protestors of the Legislative Council. They then graffitied the walls, displayed the colonial-era flag and defaced Hong Kong's regional emblem.¹⁴¹
- 7th July: Tens of thousands attended a march in Kowloon, which was notable for its popularity with mainland tourists, to try and explain the issues they had. As of this point, there had been little to no coverage in mainland China.¹⁴²
- 9th July: Carrie Lam held another press release, restating that the extradition bill was "dead" and called for protestors to stop. However, she refrained from fully withdrawing the bill.¹⁴³
- 21st July: Protesters defaced Hong Kong's China Liaison Office. Later that night, commuters were attacked in Yuen Long underground station, near mainland china, by

¹³⁸ Graham-Harrison and Yu 2019

¹³⁹ "March Of '2 Million' Forces Apology From Hong Kong Leader Over Extradition Bill" 2019

¹⁴⁰ "In Pictures: Hong Kong Police Slam 'Illegal, Irrational' Protest At HQ, As Crowds Disperse Peacefully Overnight | Hong Kong Free Press HKFP" 2019

¹⁴¹ "Hong Kong Protesters Storm The Legislative Council" 2019

¹⁴² "Hongkongers March To China Express Rail Station To 'Spread Anti-Extradition Law Message To Mainland Tourists' | Hong Kong Free Press HKFP" 2019

¹⁴³ "Hong Kong Extradition Bill Is 'Dead' Says Lam" 2019



mobs of men wearing white shirts, signalling a new escalation of violence.¹⁴⁴ There were suspicions that they were connected to or were members of gangs called triads, pointing out that the Police were exceptionally late to stop them.

- 27th July: Demonstrations attended by thousands took place to condemn the attack at the Yuen Long station. Tear gas was fired at the unauthorised protests.¹⁴⁵

August 2019

- 2nd August: Civil servants, despite being required to be politically neutral, joined demonstrations.¹⁴⁶
- 3rd August: Protests take place for the 9th consecutive weekend, with tear gas, rubber bullets and bean bag rounds being fired at protestors. This was now considered the norm and it was marked that many protesters were wearing protective gear and masks at each demonstration.¹⁴⁷
- 5th August: Another city-wide strike was held, bringing services to a halt. Carrie Lam gave a media address, her first in two weeks, saying Hong Kong was “on the verge of a very dangerous situation”.¹⁴⁸
- 6th August: China warned the protesters not to "play with fire," not to "underestimate the firm resolve [of] the central government" and not to "mistake restraint for weakness". This was considered to be a very strong warning for Beijing to issue.¹⁴⁹
- 11th August: Police storm the enclosed railway station, causing dramatic scenes, and firing tear gas at the protestors¹⁵⁰. During the confrontation, one protester is injured in her eye, which becomes the symbol of the protest movement.

¹⁴⁴ "Hong Kong Activists Hurl Eggs, Ink Balloons At Top China Office, After Huge Anti-Extradition Law Demo | Hong Kong Free Press HKFP" 2019

¹⁴⁵ "Could Deepening Hong Kong Divisions Lead To Anarchy?" 2019

¹⁴⁶ "Thousands Of Hong Kong Civil Servants Rally, Wave Of Protests Planned" 2019

¹⁴⁷ "The Twists And Turns In Hong Kong So Far" 2019

¹⁴⁸ Busby et al. 2019

¹⁴⁹ "China Warns HK Protesters Not To 'Play With Fire'" 2019

¹⁵⁰ "Hong Kong Protests: What Happened On August 11 In Tsim Sha Tsui, Sham Shui Po, Wan Chai And Kwai Chung" 2019



- 12th August: Protesters gather in the airport, leading to hundreds of flights being cancelled. ¹⁵¹This saw violent clashes between the activists and police with China publicly condemning the activists' behaviour as "close to terrorism"¹⁵², showing a hardening stance from Beijing. While this was occurring, HKPF admitted that some of the anti-government protesters the previous day were actually deployed officers who had taken on "different characters" in a "decoy operation" to target "extreme violent rioters". ¹⁵³This led to protesters turning on suspected undercover cops, one of which was a reporter.
- 18th August: a new rally takes place, but this one is characterised by the lack of any major clashes between police and activists.¹⁵⁴ Meanwhile Chinese police and military had gathered on the border in Shenzhen.
- 25th August: Violent clashes resumed with protesters firing projectiles, bricks and petrol bombs while police used tear gas, water cannons and for the first time, a live round.¹⁵⁵
- 30th August: Prominent pro-democracy activists and lawmakers were arrested by police in Hong Kong,¹⁵⁶ with police being accused of brutality on the city metro.

September 2019

- 4th September: Carrie Lam announces that she is withdrawing the highly controversial extradition bill. Activists state that this is still not enough as their other four demands have yet to be fulfilled. ¹⁵⁷

4. Areas of Discussion

4.1. Identity

One of the more recent developments is the discovery of the differences within the concept of identity. While most people within Hong Kong would be ethnically described as Chinese, which

¹⁵¹ "All Flights Cancelled Out Of Hong Kong As Thousands Of Protesters Besiege Airport Over Police Violence | Hong Kong Free Press HKFP" 2019

¹⁵² Events and Xi 2019

¹⁵³ "Hong Kong Police Admit Using 'Disguised' Officers" 2019

¹⁵⁴ "Huge Crowds Rally Peacefully In Hong Kong" 2019

¹⁵⁵ "What Led To A Single Gunshot Being Fired?" 2019

¹⁵⁶ "Hong Kong Police Arrest Top Pro-Democracy Figures" 2019

¹⁵⁷ "Hong Kong Leader To Withdraw Extradition Bill" 2019




matches with Hong Kong being a part of China, many people there do not identify themselves as Chinese. A series of surveys from the University of Hong Kong showed that, while the number of people identifying as Hong Kongers includes nearly all of the population¹⁵⁸, only 11% would identify themselves as "Chinese"¹⁵⁹, with a further 71% stating that they are unhappy and do not feel any sense of pride in being a Chinese citizen. According to the university's public opinion programme, this is particularly seen within the younger generation as "The younger the respondents, the less likely they feel proud of becoming a national citizen of China, and also the more negative they are toward the Central Government's policies on Hong Kong,"

Young Hong Kongers are increasingly unlikely to identify as 'Chinese'

% of respondents asked about ethnic identity (1997-2019)

— 18-29 year olds — All age groups



Source: Public Opinion Programme, University of Hong Kong



Source: (*"The Background You Need On The Hong Kong Protests" 2019*)

Legal, cultural and social differences, and its status as a colony for 150 years, were all stated as factors to explain the difference in identity. This is combined with anti-mainland sentiment that has seen a spike in popularity in recent years, mainly in reference to tourists disregarding local culture. Some younger protesters have also begun to make calls for independence from China, which is alarming for the Chinese Government.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ "HKU POP Releases Survey On Hong Kong People's Ethnic Identity And The 2018 Review And 2019 Forecast Survey" 2019

¹⁵⁹ "數表 Table" 2019

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, 118



4.2. The Role of the Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect is a concept that was introduced by the United Nations World Summit Outcome Document in 2005. While the sovereignty of states means that there is a fundamental right of non-intervention into many domestic issues, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect allows for a legitimate reason for intervention into these situations.

Its primary role is to protect citizens from the risk of devastating consequences such as the risk of genocide, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. While this is primarily the responsibility of states themselves, the Right to Protect allows this principle to transcend governments and so allow for all citizens to be protected under this principle.

The question posed is whether the current crisis in Hong Kong would allow intervention based on this principle. In order to ensure that the principle is protected and to keep the legitimacy of the intervention, potential interventions must be tempered to ensure that they are not interfering on too small a scale of violence, which would be protected by the principle of non-intervention and state sovereignty.

Should the international community intervene on this principal though for the sake of the protests, they may also be able to take a more active role in response to the potential infractions regarding following the UNSC sanctions. Therefore, both of these sides must be considered.

4.3. The Problem of Self-Determination

With recent statements and actions from Hong Kong protestors, separatism of Hong Kong has been identified as a key threat to Chinese national security. Additionally, the government flagged Taiwanese, Xinjiang and Tibetan separatism as further potential threats to national security. There is a lot at stake for Beijing, as the self-determination of one of each of these autonomous regions could lead to a cascading disbandment of Chinese unity.

Historically, the Hong Kong people see themselves as separate of China and with many being concerned that the extradition bill would lead them to become “Just another City” in China. Hence, China’s fear around a push for Hong Kong independence is warranted and should be reflected in China’s actions surrounding this issue.



5. Conclusion – Key Ideas

The primary question here is whether the situation that is going on is indeed a matter of international concern, both in regards to the protests and the infractions regarding the sanctions. If the situation is indeed a risk to the people of Hong Kong then that may have ramifications on the Security Council's ability to intervene. Therefore, even if the actions of China are problematic the Security Council must consider whether the actions of the protesters could be considered violent and confrontational. Therefore, there is a serious question as to whether China is indeed engaging in counter-terror activities that may be heavy handed or whether this is a justified response.

The role of China must also be considered. As a Permanent Member of the Security Council, China can veto any solution offered by this body. Therefore, delegates will have to provide a solution that will find the support of the People's Republic. As seen previously, many nations have been reluctant to condemn Chinese actions due to their dependence on Chinese trade. Nations that are seen as condemning China too heavily may face diplomatic and trade repercussions.

Finally, there is also the issue of national sovereignty. Many other nations have previously practiced a form of cultural assimilation and it could be argued that the Chinese have the right to do the same to strengthen their nation. Given that this issue is an entirely internal matter it could be argued that the Security Council has no place to get involved in this situation; nations will have to consider this fact.



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Information about the Conference

1. Conference Schedule

HamMUN 2019 "Shaping a New Era of Diplomacy"					
November 27, 2019	November 28, 2019		November 29, 2019	November 30, 2019	December 1, 2019
Wed	Thurs		Fri	Sat	Sun
			Session II	Session IV	Session VI
	Registration		9:00 - 13:00	9:00 - 13:00	10:00 - 12:00
	10:00 - 14:30				Committee Debriefing 12:00 - 13:00
	Chair Briefing 12:30 - 13:45	RoP - Workshop 12:15 - 13:45	Lunch Break 13:00 - 14:00	Lunch Break 13:00 - 14:00	Chair Debriefing 13:30 - 14:00
	Opening		Session III	Session V	Closing Ceremony 14:00 - 15:30
	Ceremony		14:00 - 18:00	14:00 - 18:00	
Pre-Program 16:00 - 19:00	15:30 - 17:30				
	Session I				
	18:00 - 20:00		Break	Break	
Get Together					
19:00	Committee Evening				
	20:00		Silent Disco	Delegate Ball	
			21:00	21:00	

Please note: This schedule is subject to change. For the most up-to-date schedule, please check: hammun.de/conference-schedule



2. Rules of Procedure

HamMUN 2019 session will follow the Rules of Procedure which can be found here: <http://hammun.de/rops/>.

For first time delegates we recommend participating in the *Rules of Procedure workshop* on Thursday.

3. Emergency Phone Numbers

Police: 110

Fire Brigade: 112

Casualty doctor: 112

4. Important Addresses

Conference venue: Edmund-Siemers-Allee 1, 20146 Hamburg (*and other places at Hamburg University main campus*)

Opening ceremony: Laeishalle, Kleiner Konzertsaal, Johannes-Brahms-Platz, 20355 Hamburg

Registration: Audimax Garderobe, Von-Melle-Park 4, 20146 Hamburg

Committee Evening: *Different places, your chairs will inform you*

Silent Disco: Club Hamburg, Reeperbahn 48, 20359 Hamburg

Delegate Ball: Gruenspan, Große Freiheit 58, 22767 Hamburg

5. Public Transport

During the conference, **your badge will be your ticket**. Please have your badge with you **all the time!** Public Transport in Hamburg will provide you with busses, tubes and city railroads.

Service Times:

Wednesday + Thursday: Service stops at **1 am**, afterwards you can only take night busses

Friday – Sunday: Whole night service

Stops near to conference venues:

Conference venue + Registration + Committee Evening:



(different places at Hamburg main campus)

S-Bahn Station **Dammtor**: Lines S11, S21, S31

Bus Station **Dammtor**: Line 109

Bus Station **Universität/Staatsbibliothek**: Lines 4, 5

Opening Ceremony:

Walking distance from Registration: 20 Minutes

Bus Station **Johannes-Brahms-Platz**: Line 3

Tube Station **Messehallen**: Line U2

Silent Disco (*Fridays Social*) + Delegates Ball (*Saturdays Social*):

S-Bahn Station **Reeperbahn**: Lines S1, S2, S3

Bus Station **Davidstraße**: Line 111

Tube Station **St. Pauli**: Line U3

6. HamMUN App

HamMUN is proud to offer a mobile app during the conference. You can get it on your phone by typing this URL <https://hammun.lineupr.com/2019> into your mobile browser.

Please note that the app is not to be installed via your app store but is a desktop shortcut of a mobile website!

7. Water Supply

In case you are thirsty (or sober), don't worry. Water out of the tap is perfectly drinkable!

8. Please bring cash!

Unlike in other European nations, many stores, cafeterias and especially the social venues often do not accept credit cards! Make sure to have cash with you.

